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Abstract 
 
A common belief of the global community is that Income inequality in Brazil has decreased. 
This paper analyses the composition of income inequality in Brazil through the effects of 
neoliberal policies on the relationship between capital flows and income inequality from the 
1980s to 2015. The neoliberal policy that will be the focus of this paper, is the Washington 
Consensus which was introduced in the early 1990s. The historical analysis situates the 
Consensus in the context of Brazil. Hyman P. Minsky’s theory of financial instability applied to 
Brazil reveals the flaws within standard neoclassical trade theories underlying the Consensus, i.e. 
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and the Factor Price Equalization Theorem. These standard theories 
provide further understanding of the relationships between income inequality and capital flows, 
capital controls and financial liberalization. Which can be applied and compared to the actual 
trajectory of income inequality after the Washington Consensus was introduced to Brazil. The 
effect of capital flows on income inequality in Brazil, was for the most part negative. High 
volumes of inflows contributed to economic recessions and crises in, exacerbating the income 
inequality that already exists. The result is the Middle 40 percent income shares are being 
squeezed out, from the increase in income of the Bottom 50 percent and the stagnation of the 
Top 10 percent. The decline in the inequality is derived from the movements of the Bottom 50 
percent shares and the Top 10 percent shares which can be partially attributed to Brazil’s 
successful conditional cash transfer program, the Bolsa Família. A conclusion that comes from 
Minsky’s theory, a lesson posed as a counterfactual of the crises is, that capital flows should be 
regulated and there should be restrictions on the volume of inflows. The future for Brazil’s 
inequality is unknown. With the worst recession in history and without careful consideration of 
both domestic policies and those concerning trade, there is the possibility of a relapse in the 
progress made in the income distribution. 
 
JEL codes: F6, G01, N36, N26, N76, O54,    
 
 
 
 
  1 
Introduction 
 
 Prominently neoliberalism has been at the forefront of economic policies issued by 
developed countries and institutions. Neoclassical models are the underlying theories for policies 
instituted by developed countries onto the developing world. Neoclassical models have flaws 
that do not represent nor theorize how economies function in reality. In neoclassical models 
factors within the economy which have resulted in unfavorable results are considered by the 
model through the assumptions. One factor that is often either left in the assumptions or entirely 
unaddressed is income distribution and the effects policies have on income inequality. Globally, 
economists have seen an increasing trend of income inequality in most countries from the 1980s 
onwards. Exceptions to this trend are Brazil and the Latin American region, who have witnessed 
a reduction in income inequality from the 1990s to present. With the decreasing inequality, 
Brazil has received much scrutiny as to the mechanisms in the economy that have permitted the 
government to achieve this result. 
 Income inequality in Brazil remains a pervasive issue as its inequality is among the 
highest globally. Most of the literature that attends to income inequality focuses on the 
relationships between inequality and investment into human capital. This paper is an analysis of 
the largely negative effects of neoliberal driven capital flows have had on income inequality 
focusing on the trajectory from the 1980s debt crisis to as current as 2015.  
 The first chapter is a historical analysis of the macroeconomy of Brazil from the 1980s 
debt crisis to the end of President Dilma Rouseff’s impeachment. It situates the Washington 
Consensus in a historical context. The key principles of the Washington Consensus have had a 
direct, negative effect on income inequality. They promoted a high volume of capital inflows and 
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the result in Brazil’s economy becoming increasingly vulnerable to external shocks, i.e. 
contagion, spillover effects, capital flight, capital reversals. Brazil was especially vulnerable to 
capital flows in the recovery period following the debt crisis. There was a current account deficit 
and the capital flows continued to compound on the exorbitant amount of debt from the crisis. 
Economic stabilization was a result of the openness of the markets. The downside in the 
increased openness of the financial markets was that there were increased possibilities for 
negative effects from external factors. Eventually, Brazil managed to sustain a decade of 
economic growth and stability which was interrupted by the Global Financial Crisis. The policies 
that were enforced in the aftermath of the crisis, consequently resulted in a lasting recession in 
Brazil.  
 The effects of the Washington Consensus have altered the trajectory of Brazil’s 
development and inequality, and shaped domestic policies. The consequences have carried 
through the decade of crises in the emerging market economies, the 1994 Real Plan, the decade 
of economic growth and stability, to the global financial crisis and the subsequent period 
afterwards.  
 The second chapter includes the two main neoclassical theories that are the basis for trade 
economics and policies. The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and the Factor-Price Equalization 
Theorem are neoclassical theories that were the basis for the Washington Consensus and are 
continually used to validate trade agreements. Both theorems prioritize economic development 
assuming that the Solow growth model will hold true in each instance. The Solow growth model 
claims that in the general trajectory of development, income inequality increases to a point, 
which is the peak. Generally, it exists in the transition from middle income status to high income. 
Once a country crosses the threshold of development into high income, then inequality should 
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continue to fall until it is no longer an issue. The issue is that these theories promoted the 
reintegration of Brazil into the global capital markets to allow for the state to repay its original 
debt. This resulted in the government only compounding its debt.  
 Hyman P. Minsky, a heterodox economist, constructed a theory of Financial Fragility 
which has managed to predict and explain the crises within the last 35 years. His theory, applied 
to the global context, is set to juxtapose the neoclassical theories as an alternative that could have 
predicted the crises in Latin America and the emerging market economies based on the economic 
conditions leading up to the crises. Basically, with the increasingly high volume of capital 
inflows into Brazil as a method of recovery from the crisis, the economy became increasingly 
vulnerable to negative shocks. The negative shocks can manifest in the domestic or the foreign 
markets. Because Brazil’s debt was high, their reintegration into the global capital markets 
allowed for the country to compound on their debt from the previous crisis. There was also a 
current account deficit that too was carried over. To continue to borrow in the capital market, 
firms in Brazil gradually transitioned from low-risk and medium-risk firms to medium and high-
risk borrowing firms. Eventually, the consequences of the unsustainable debt have been the crisis 
in the 1980s in Latin America, then thereafter the subsequent crises in the emerging market 
economies in throughout the 1990s and the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-8.  
 The third chapter is a case study of Brazil. It includes an analysis of the common belief 
that throughout the late 1990s into the early 2000s, Brazil reduced its income inequality. Its 
income inequality has been among the highest, if not the highest in the world. It was viewed as 
remarkable because in this period, income inequalities in most countries increased. Brazil was 
the exception along with countries in Latin America. This paper uses the theorized relationships 
between capital flows, financial liberalization and capital controls against income inequality and 
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applying the results to Brazil. The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and the Factor-Price Equalization 
Theorem contribute to the construction of the generalized relationships that are then applied to 
Brazil’s history. To further demonstrate the effects of the aspects of capital flows listed above, 
Marc Morgan’s analysis of the trajectory of income inequality using pre-tax income shares in the 
period of 2001-2015 is utilized. 
 Morgan’s research illustrates the trajectory of the income shares in Brazil, and it is 
apparent that although the income inequality has reduced, it has been widely overestimated. 
Throughout this period, the top income shares have remained relatively stagnant, neither gaining 
nor losing income. The Bottom 50 percent income shares have increased throughout this period 
at the expense of the Middle 40 percent income shares. This is where it is evident that there has 
been a decline in income inequality, but the reduction is derived from the decline between the 
bottom shares and the top shares.  
 The relationship that capital flows have with income inequality, specifically in Brazil is 
in the past, is negative. From the 1970s, Brazil has been considered an emerging market 
economy. It is a developing economy that in the past decade has experienced positive and steady 
economic growth and relatively high interest rates. Because of these factors, Brazil has attracted 
high volumes of capital flows in the form of foreign direct investments and portfolio 
investments.  
 The aftermath of the debt crisis brought with it the Washington Consensus which 
promoted reintegration of Brazil back into the global capital market, which proved to be more 
harmful for the country while in a period of recovery. It can be said that either way, eventually, 
the high influx of capital flows into the economy have led to recessions and crises. In periods of 
crisis and a contraction in the economy, capital flows only exacerbate the income inequality. In 
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expansionary periods, capital flows are beneficial, they promote domestic investment which 
triggers economic growth and development. They also increase the vulnerability of the economy, 
especially in economies which have to some degree financially liberalized. This is the case for 
Brazil, capital flows have proven to be partially beneficial especially in periods of economic 
growth. But the neoliberal policies that are prominent are not conducive to the stability of the 
economy with capital flows.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 In a period that spans from the 1980s to as current as 2015, the trajectory of Brazil’s 
economy has been tumultuous. By the 1970s, Brazil was considered an emerging market 
economy with a promising developmental path and strong economic growth. Brazil’s income 
inequality was one of the highest. Economic development and growth would provide the 
Brazilian government with the capital to counteract the inequality with policies that would target 
the middle and low income shares. In the span of 35 years, Brazil’s trajectory has adjusted with 
years of crises responding to the neoliberal policies. Although the neoliberal policies provided 
capital investments into the economy, there were repercussion of the capital flows  which were 
not entirely beneficial for the income distribution. This chapter is a historical analysis of the past 
four decades of Brazil with the purpose of providing context for the succeeding chapters that 
situates the specifics of capital flows and income inequality within a period of time.  
 
1.1. 1980s Debt Crisis  
 Developing countries characteristically adopt Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI) 
to stimulate economic growth that is induced by domestic industrialization as a form of self-
reliance and a step towards economic development. The issue with Latin America’s application 
of ISI was that while enabling domestic industrialization, there is this heavy reliance from the 
economy on self-industrialization to provide the commodities that would normally be imported. 
This in turn caused a deficit in the current account balance and an increasing debt problem 
(Kregel, 2008 p. 3). For Latin America to fund the asymmetry in trade they needed to borrow to 
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maintain the funding of industrialization in combination with the capital for the remaining 
imports and to produce exports that were being brought into the region. Developed countries like 
the United States were the main shareholders of Latin America’s debt.  
 ISI was working well in Latin America’s favor in the 1970s, they were introducing new 
industries into the domestic economies simultaneously while maintaining steady, if not 
increasing economic growth. This prosperous period was short-lived. In 1979, the United States’ 
chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker announced policy measures that would combat 
the rising inflation in the United States for the last decade. Of Volcker’s proposed policy 
measures, raising the interest rate was going to directly impact Latin America the most because 
the United State and other developed countries held a large proportion of their foreign debt. 
Increasing the interest rate for Latin America would increase the amount of interest and 
ultimately the total amount for their debt repayment. The increase in the interest rates in 
combination with Latin America’s floating exchange rate, as a response to the collapse of the 
Bretton-Woods System and the energy crisis of the 1970s, led to the overall crumbling of Latin 
America’s balance of payments1. The Bretton-Woods System provided the developing countries 
of Latin America with the means to maintain their financial imbalances that came about from the 
private capital inflows which were a necessity for sustaining ISI. In this, Latin America was able 
to avoid adjustment with private capital flows in combination with large external deficits and 
currency appreciation (Kregel, 2008* p. 7), which was a large component in the issues of Latin 
America’s debt.  
                                                 
1 The mentioned events preceding the 1980’s debt crisis will not be further elaborated due to the 
material being beyond the scope of this paper.   
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 The theoretical limit for Latin America’s maintenance of their financial imbalances came 
about through Evsey Domar’s 19502 analysis researching the conditions necessary for financial 
imbalance sustainability. Kregel equates the economic conditions during this period to conditions 
in which a Ponzi financial unit can exist. Latin America was continuously purchasing foreign 
exchange reserves with the full awareness of their inability to repay the principle and the interest 
amount. This was to finance their domestic industrialization which ended up contributing to their 
piling debt. In combination with the other factors of the Bretton-Woods System’s collapse, the 
1970s petroleum crisis and the United States increasing their interest rates ultimately led to Latin 
America’s debt crisis.  
 
1.2 The Brady Plan and the Washington Consensus 
 Mexico was the first to make the global economy aware of its insolvency closely 
followed by Argentina, which resulted in a full-blown debt crisis by 1983 (Roett, 1985). In 
response to Latin America’s announcements of insolvency, the US, the Federal Reserve and the 
IMF put into action the Brady Plan in 1982 which was the beginnings of the better-known 
Washington Consensus (Kregel, 2008 p. 542).  
 
1.2.1 The Brady Plan 
 The Brady Plan had three conditions that would bring the region back into the 
international capital markets and expand the role of the market in economic decision making 
(Kregel, 2008 p. 542). The two objectives mentioned above were contingent on “1) debt relief in 
exchange for assurance of collectability in principle and interest collateral 2) debt relief linked to 
                                                 
2 Refer to Domar (1950).  
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an assurance of economic reform 3) the resulting debt would be more tradable, allowing for 
creditors to diversify risk more widely through financial and investment community” (“The 
Brady Plan”, 2009).   
 
1.2.2 The Washington Consensus 
 The Brady Plan gave way for the Washington Consensus which codified the general 
objectives the Brady Plan laid out (Kregel, 2008 p. 542). It was a continuation that expanded on 
policies and reforms. Washington and the Federal Reserve chair, John Williamson believed that 
it was the key to successfully overcoming the current crisis and were preventative measures in 
avoiding future crises. Further, the Washington Consensus detailed a list of ten principles that 
gave developed economies access to exploit Latin America’s resources. Of the ten principles of 
the Consensus, included was decreasing government spending in hopes to alleviate the 
overwhelming nature of the budget deficits that were abundant in the region, tax reforms, public 
investments and reallocation of the public investment, market deregulation and liberalization, 
privatization, competitive exchange rates, decreasing inflation, financial reforms, further 
integration into the foreign capital markets, and instituting the protection of property rights (Berr, 
Combarnous, 2007 p. 527 & 528). Ultimately, the adoption of these policies was in the hopes 
that these economies would once again attract capital flows and “attack” the “non-debt” flows, 
speeding up the economic recovery and debt relief (Cornford, Kregel, 1996 p. 13). This included 
decreasing/eliminating the inflation rate and increasing the attractiveness of Latin America to 
capital flows to repay their uncontrollable debt. The Brady Plan was successful in attracting 
capital inflows, but what remained was high inflation, hyperinflation in many Latin American 
countries, especially Brazil.  
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 Contrary to neoclassical belief, the years of liberalization and reform negatively impacted 
income inequality and poverty in Brazil. Paul Krugman cites a study of Miguel Szekely’s (2001) 
which provided evidence that there was a positive correlation between inequality and the 
progress, or lack thereof in reducing poverty (Krugman, 2008).  
 
1.3 Stabilization in the Real Plan 
 In the intermediary years from the Washington Consensus to 1999, Brazil set about 
enacting a stabilization policy as an extension of the Brady Plan. In 1994 Brazil’s stabilization 
plan, the Real Plan (Plano Real) was executed (Kregel, 2000 p. 1). It benefitted from the post-
Brady Plan economy which had accomplished liberalization, the renewed influx of capital flows, 
an obsession from developed countries to diversify their portfolios, and “the exploitation of 
excess returns in emerging markets” (Kregel, 2000 p. 4). The goals of the Real Plan were to 
eliminate the indexing of wages and prices, and to use the nominal exchange rate as an anchor 
for stability (Kregel, 2000 p. 4). The state planned to use the nominal exchange rate as an anchor 
to eliminate the inertial inflation as a stabilization method after the volatility of the previous 
decade.  
 The Real Plan was a successful domestic policy achieving a rapid decline in the domestic 
inflation rate from the currency appreciation, of almost 15 percent (Kregel, 2000 p. 4). It 
reinforced the return of net capital inflows. This was trademarked as a success of economic 
improvement for Brazil. Investors were assured of the reliability and high yielding returns with 
the high interest rate, reinforcing the volume of capital inflows. After the Bretton-Woods 
exchange rate regime collapsed, Brazil took on a floating exchange rate. As a condition of the 
Real Plan, the state switched over to a fixed exchange rate regime that would maintain 
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“competitiveness by putting pressure on the domestic producers from foreign imports” (Kregel, 
2000 p. 4). The use of the fixed exchange rate acted more as a stimulant to international trade 
providing stability for domestic firms. This resulted in negatively affecting domestic producers 
who were unable to adjust their costs accordingly, with the Real’s appreciation and the pressures 
from global imports. The result was the resurfacing of the imbalance in the balance of payments 
but within the neoliberal, liberalized trade context.  
 The conditions of the Washington Consensus were meant as a stabilizer for crises of a 
similar nature through neoliberal economic structures. Therefore, the unsustainable balance of 
payments that the Real Plan saw should have been eliminated as proposed in neoclassical 
theories. The capital inflows that accompanied the imbalance of payments influenced fiscal 
conditions. In response to the inflation from the Real Plan, Brazil’s Central Bank enlisted a 
sterilization to protect the monetary policy. The sterilization policy required the transaction of 
selling domestic bonds in exchange for foreign exchange reserves that were reinvested at a low 
foreign interest rate, leading to a situation where the cost outweighed the returns (Kregel, 2000 p. 
6). The negative effect of the reinvestment, simultaneously with the decrease in inflation rate, 
reinforced the deterioration of Brazil’s “fiscal position” (Kregel, 2000 p. 4). The decreased 
position of the inflation rate produced an increase in real expenditure which was apparent in the 
increase in household incomes. The currency appreciation forced the prices to decline rapidly, 
resulting in the prices of liberalized imports to fall (Kregel, 2000 p. 11). The decrease in prices of 
imports that had been liberalized and the increase in real incomes and household incomes 
resulted in a consumption boom of liberalized imports. The Real Plan was not entirely 
successful. The a rapid decline in inflation was accomplished, but the means to accomplish this 
reinforced the deterioration of the current account through the Central Bank’s sterilization policy 
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and the heavy reliance on high interest rates, ultimately leading to the exchange rate crisis in 
1999 (Kregel, 2000 p. 11).  
 Although there were aspects of Brazil’s Real Plan that were economically unsuccessful, it 
was able to encourage domestic growth, tackling the high income inequality. The 
macroeconomic stabilization that was essential to policies that the state enforced promoted a 
rapid increase in income growth of the poor (Clements, 1997 p. 46). Therefore, inequality within 
poverty decreased. The Monthly Employment Survey (1996) provides evidence that in the period 
between 1994 and 1995, the incomes of the Bottom 50 percent increased while the top percent 
shares increased at a much slower rate of 10 percent. During the same period, the poverty rate 
decreased from 30. 4 percent to 20.6 percent (Clements, 1997 p. 46). The decline in the poverty 
rate decreased the gap in poverty and showed a decrease in the disparity in income amongst the 
bottom incomes.  
 
1.4 Emerging Market Crises of the late 1990s 
 In a span of a decade following the Consensus’ years, several developing economies 
collapsed in a set of financial crises that were not altogether unrelated. Which began in 1994 
with Mexico’s Tequila Crisis. From there in a quick succession the East Asian countries in 1997, 
Russia 1998, Brazil 1999, and Argentina in 2001 (Kregel, 2008* p. 9). The rapid timeline of 
these crises was not a coincidence, they were ultimately a resolution of sorts. Collectively, with 
sharp capital flow reversals, these financial crises were a default form of domestic policy 
adjustment related to the policies of the Washington Consensus (Kregel, 2008* p. 7).  
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1.4.1 Capital Flow Reversals 
 The crises that followed were the result of failings of the generality of the neoliberal 
policies that came with the Washington Consensus. According to Kregel, these crises were 
ultimately a result of a need for domestic adjustment that they all had managed to evade through 
careful use of their domestic policies. The Washington Consensus reintroduced the developing 
countries into the global capital market. The results were that capital flows were made 
abundantly available to countries. Latin American countries were once again permitted to 
continue their accumulation of debt compounded onto the pre-existing debt leftover from the 
crisis and the debt repayment plans that were a result. In brief periods of distorted conditions of 
recovery, Latin American countries accumulated not only more loans, but foreign direct 
investments and foreign exchange reserves. These reserves were not in their domestic currencies, 
but in stronger currencies, i.e. United States Dollar, British Pound, Euro. Figure 1 in the 
Appendix3 provides evidence of Brazil accumulating reserves beginning in the early 1990s.  
 As the Latin American economies again began showing signs of trouble investors’ fears 
of another crisis increased. During this period of liberalization and reforms, markets were 
extremely vulnerable to negative external shocks and with the possibility of trouble, investors 
were moving their capital out of the country and into safer portfolios. After realizing that the 
foreign exchange reserves were not beneficial for their currencies from the influx of capital 
moving out of the economy and debt continuing to accumulate at alarming rates, the 
governments sold their foreign exchange reserves. They, they completed the cycles of capital 
flow reversals. Capital flow reversals from speculation are what ultimately led to the financial 
crises that occurred in the succeeding years.  
                                                 
3 All succeeding figures will be located in the Appendix. 
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1.4.2 Tequila Crisis 
 In 1994 Mexico experienced an exchange rate crisis that emerged from the Peso. After 
the Bretton-Woods system’s collapse, Mexico adopted a pegged exchange rate (Edwards, 1999 
p. 3) in the hopes that it would help to maintain economic stability and international trade in 
exports to increase Mexico’s stock of international reserves (Kregel, 2000 p. 6). In Mexico’s 
case, the pegged system was used to “guide disinflation and to maintain macroeconomic 
stability” (Edwards, 1999 p. 4) needed during the period of recovery. The main problem that 
economists have with exchange rate-stabilization programs is that the inflation tends towards a 
significant degree of inertial inflation (Edwards, 1999 p. 4), like what Brazil was attempting to 
combat in the form of the Real Plan. Like before the Real Plan, domestic prices and wages 
increased leading to a decrease in the competitiveness of exports, generating into an 
overvaluation of the real exchange rate (Edwards, 1999 p. 4). Edwards cites Rudiger Dornbush’s 
remarks on Mexico’s crisis. He adds that the real appreciation was with a large current account 
deficit and a decrease in the rate of exports. To eventually re-stabilize the economy, a currency 
devaluation was necessary (Edwards, 1999 p. 4) along with appropriate monetary and fiscal 
policy that combats the other conditions that arise with the reaction to the negative external 
shocks. Before the 1994 crisis, the current account deficit was in part exacerbated by the Brady 
Plan’s purpose of reintegrating Latin America back into the global capital markets. This had 
decreased the competitiveness of exports Mexico had experienced prior. To attract foreign 
investment and capital inflows back into the country in 1994, the Mexican government and 
financial institutions issued “dollar-linked securities – the infamous Tesobonos” along with 
increasing the interest rate and appreciating the exchange rate. By the second half of the year, 
investments were being pulled out of the country resulting in speculation by the residents who 
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moved large funds out of the country (Edwards, 1999 p. 13) eventually leading to and 
exacerbating a crisis. This is an example of capital flow reversals, another instance is what 
happened in East Asian countries.  
 
1.4.3 East Asian Crisis 
 The East Asian crisis in 1997 came as a shock to economists around the world. Preceding 
the crisis, the East Asian countries were formally dubbed as the “Miracle” considering the 
magnitude of their steadily increasing economic growth and the overall success of the economy. 
Instead of utilizing ISI as a policy to stabilize the country while industrializing, the East Asian 
countries adopted export-substitution industrialization to accomplish the same goals, which 
might be a reason for their “miracle” growth.  
 Up to the crisis, large volumes of capital were being flooded into Asia. The crisis was 
initiated with the Thai government devaluing their currency, the Baht. In the preceding period, 
Korea and the other Asian countries were experiencing troubles within their government and 
financial institutions. With the Thai Baht’s devaluation investors fled to other regions with the 
guarantee of higher returns which led to Asian countries’ currencies to fall and a capital reversal, 
spiraling the economies into contractions (Radelet, Sachs, 1998 p. 2). The crisis spread to the 
economically stronger East Asian countries during the transition towards financial liberalization 
and reform (Radelet, Sachs, 1998 p. 5). Both were conditions of the Washington Consensus that 
the neoclassical economists used to open the markets to international trade. In the East Asian 
Crisis, vulnerability of the market to negative shocks was apparent in the magnitude of the crisis 
and the fact of its initial unpredictability. 
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1.4.4 Soviet Union Crisis 
 Almost in quick succession, crises in the Soviet Union, Brazil, and Argentina hit the 
global market, affecting the overall stability of the global economy. The crisis in 1998 was a 
direct result of the economic and political actions after the fall of the Soviet Union.  Following 
the Soviet Union’s collapse, the state enacted economic and structural reform. Including policies 
like privatization and macroeconomic stabilization practices that were popular among 
neoclassical economics were applied to Latin America (Chiodo, Owayang, 2002 p. 9). The crisis 
hit the economy as it was showing signs of positive economic growth. The Russian Central Bank 
established exchange rate controls and there was a visible shift in the balance of payments 
towards an equalization of imports and exports. Output was recovering, oil prices, their main 
export, were increasing and the state was in negotiations to repay its sovereign debt (Chiodo, 
Owayang, 2002 p. 9).  
 A year before the crisis in Russia, the East Asian crisis ensued resulting in speculatory 
flows of the Ruble making it vulnerable to negative external shocks (Chiodo, Owayang, 2002 p. 
16), requiring the state to sell U.S. foreign exchange reserves to protect the currency. 
Simultaneously while speculation was surrounding the Russian Ruble, holders of short-term 
government bills (GKOs) signed contracts to exchange GKOs with foreign currency, expecting 
the Ruble to lose value (Chiodo, Owayang, 2002 p. 12). Combination of media speculation, 
shocks to oil prices, and debt all led to investors selling Russian bonds and securities (Chiodo, 
Owayang, 2002 p. 14) who were wary of the Russian economy’s stability and the political 
atmosphere. The capital flow reversal was due to expectations and speculations, eventually led to 
the Russian Federation’s stock market crash in 1998. The contagion eventually reached Brazil in 
1999.  
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1.4.5 Brazilian Crisis 
 In 1999, Brazil was hit with another crisis. This time instead of primarily a balance of 
payments crisis, it was a currency crisis. It involved the unsolved debt deficit issues, the 
exchange rate and an official devaluation, the inflation rate and how all those factors affected 
capital flows in Brazil. A main objective of the Real Plan was to gain control over the domestic 
inflation rate in relation to the United States’ inflation (Gruben, Welch, 2001 p. 13). This 
remained to be an unsolved issue that the Brazilian state was grappling with along with the debt 
that had been compounding since the crisis in the 1980s. Brazil’s debt led to a fiscal deficit that 
was the remainder of the current account imbalance debt. Because Brazil was continuing to 
accumulate debt and the reminder of its history of debt default, investors were wary of the 
stability of the economy. Which translated into high interest rates resulting in “large interest 
payment portions of the deficit” (Gruben, Welch, 2001 p. 14). The interest rates were already 
high with the Real Plan policies that responded to the recent crises in Mexico, Asia, and Russia. 
Brazil further increased the interest rates (Gruben, Welch, 2001 p. 15) to protect their exchange 
rate from the capital flows that were abundant in the country.  
 After the 1998 Russian crisis, investors viewed the rise in the interest rate in a speculative 
manner. This increased the suspicion of the viability of the stabilization efforts (Gruben, Welch, 
2001 p. 15) and increased the fiscal deficit interest rate payments, causing further suspicion of 
the sustainability of the debt. The “breaking point” which can be argued, ultimately led to the 
devaluation of the Real, was the announcement of the suspension debt payments to the Brazilian 
government by Governor Itamar Franco (Gruben, Welch, 2001 p. 15). Franco’s announcement 
was a realization of the fears that investors, economists, and politicians had concerning Brazil’s 
debt sustainability. It eventually resulted in the devaluation of the Brazilian Real and an increase 
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in the rate of capital outflows by capital flight (Gruben, Welch, 2001 p. 21). Contagion from 
Brazil’s crisis spread easily through Latin America and impacted the initial stages of the crisis in 
Argentina.  
 
1.4.6 Argentinian Crisis 
 The Argentinian crisis in 2001 was the final crisis that marked the ending of a decade of 
emerging market crises brought about by capital flow reversals and effects of contagion. 
Recovery from the 1980s debt crisis in Latin America was hindered by the effects of the crises 
that occurred in rapid succession from 1994 to 1999. Negative shocks that affected Argentina 
came primarily from Russia’s default and Brazil’s devaluation, one in the accessibility of the 
market and the other in the competitiveness of foreign currency. Both simultaneously forcing the 
country into a recession that would last through to 2002 (Setser, Gelpern, 2006 p. 467). With the 
lengthy recession the country was experiencing, investors lost interest in the government bonds 
(Setser, Gelpern, 2006 p. 467). In response to the loss in investiture, the government turned to 
the IMF for aid. Argentina and the IMF had a long-standing relationship that proved to be 
prosperous for the country in the recovery from the 1980s debt crisis (Setser, Gelpern, 2006 p. 
471). The IMF’s stabilization policies that were implemented by Argentina were highly 
successful, incentivizing flocks of investment into the country. The loss of investor’s interest in 
government bonds saw a capital flow reversal, instead of investment flowing into the country, 
capital was flowing out with the domestic debt continuing to accumulate at highly unsustainable 
rates. The call for the IMF for help was temporarily successful in improving the market’s 
credibility with the public, but it was short lived. After exhausting the resources of the IMF, 
domestic and foreign banks, the Argentinian government “unilaterally restructured its domestic 
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debt and defaulted on its external bonds at the end of 2001” (Setser, Gelpern, 2006 p. 467). The 
default on its external bonds broke the credibility of the market once again and in response there 
were a series of domestic banks runs which left domestic, private and public debt to be 
restructured (Setser, Gelpern, 2006 p. 467). In this mess, the government was forced to default 
on domestic debt, devalue their Peso, abandon convertibility of their assets, Pesification4, and 
restructure their debts. Capital flow reversals are the faults of the Washington Consensus with 
the policies that forcibly promoted trade liberalization and financial reforms, leaving the 
economies more vulnerable to negative shocks.  
 
1.5 21st Century  
 The crisis in Argentina marked the conclusion to the 20th century and the control of 
neoliberalism that wrecked Latin America. The commencement of the 21st century with Latin 
America, especially Brazil, asserted itself in the policies that will define the future of the 
economy. The Washington Consensus was implemented in various states and fashions 
throughout Latin America until 2003. Because the Consensus was applied with Asian Miracle-
like stability in mind, and not tailored specifically towards the separate economies, the 
Consensus was an obvious fail. By the end of the Consensus years, the Latin American countries 
were cognizant of the impact of the forced policies favoring the developed OECD countries that 
created them. Elections swung towards political leaders to the left who criticized the consensus 
(Edwards, 2008 p. 130). They in turn forced out the involvement of those said OECD countries 
and their institutions in favor of the protection provided by their policies 
                                                 
4 Pesification: conversion of foreign debt to Peso denominations (Setser, Gelpern, 2006) 
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which were aimed at improving their own domestic economies. Policies that many of the Latin 
American countries adopted were intended to tackle social issues such as poverty. The reversal 
of several policies under the Consensus such as the “nationalization of industries, increased 
government controls and higher import tariffs” (Edwards, 2008 p. 131) became more apparent as 
the countries developed under the neoliberal regime. To combat the negative impact on the 
bottom income shares, Latin American countries employed welfare programs, i.e. conditional 
cash transfer programs. Brazil’s specific cash transfer program was the Bolsa Familia5.   
 
1.5.1 Bolsa Familia 
 The Bolsa Familia has evolved from 1990s sub-national programs attacking poverty with 
Cardoso’s regime. In the late 1990s Brazil, like other Latin American countries, began to take 
notice of the depth of poverty that resulted the Washington Consensus. President ‘Lula’ was the 
main champion of the working class, he continued the initiatives that his predecessor President 
Cardoso created under the umbrella term Fome Zero, Zero Hunger (Hall, 2008 p. 803). There 
were four state-run programs under the Fome Zero6 that dealt with education, healthcare, child 
labor, and nutrition subsidies. By 2003, the Fome Zero had significantly expanded to dispensing 
nearly $500 million USD in grants to nearly the entirety of Brazil (Hall, 2008 p. 804). President 
‘Lula’’s Fome Zero encouraged private domestic donors and international donors to expand the 
                                                 
5 For further information on Latin American conditional cash transfer programs refer to, 
Rhinehart, McGuire, (2017); Soares, Ribas, Osório, (2010); 
6 Hall (2008): Under the Fome Zero were the Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, Auxilío Gas, and 
the PETI program (Programa de Erradicão do Trabalho Infantil), and later Cartão Alimentação. 
The Bolsa Escola was the largest of the four programs, granting mothers a monthly stipend 
provided that their children attended school 85percent of the school year. The Bolsa Alimentação 
focused on maternal nutrition, PETI program protected against child labor, and the Auxilío Gas 
provided a stipend for gas. President ‘Lula’ added the Cartão Alimentação which dealt with 
electronic cards that permitted a subsidized purchase of certain products.  
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program’s wide-reach. The World Bank provided support to the program under the expectation 
that it would provide short-term relief and provisions that would improve the livelihoods of the 
impoverished as a foundation for development. Fome Zero’s deterioration was partially due to 
the fragmented implementation of the programs and political corruption that harkened back to 
past failed programs (Hall, 2008 p. 813). 
 In the wake of the corruption accusations, the Bolsa Família 7  was created as a 
replacement, in name, for the politically corrupted Fome Zero. Under the Bolsa Família the four 
state-run welfare programs remained, with President ‘Lula’ increasing the benefits and merging 
the conditionalities (Hall, 2008 p. 805). The Bolsa Família prospered with restructuring and 
centralizing the infrastructure, it targeted the “poor” and the “very poor” 8 . Extremely 
impoverished households were automatically guaranteed a flat monthly payment regardless of 
the household distribution (Hall, 2008 p. 805). International support was extremely forthcoming 
following the restructuring of the public safety-net programs. In 2004 both the World Bank and 
the International Development Bank committed to loaning almost a quarter of the funding for 
President ‘Lula’s first term (Hall, 2008 p. 804).  
 The World Bank considers the Bolsa Família the most successful and targeted cash 
conditional program with wide-spread programs that include, for the first time in Brazil, groups 
that would not normally qualify under social safety-net programs, i.e. indigenous, homeless and 
the quilombola9. Its attributed success in covering the poorest 20 percent with 73 percent of the 
benefits (Hall, 2008 p. 807) is partially owed to the inherent nature of the program, which is 
                                                 
7 Under both the Bolsa Escola and the Bolsa Família, the provisions provided mothers stipends 
for education, health care, and nutrition.  
8Hall (2008): The Brazilian government classifies poor as earnings of about $73 USD (R 60.1 – 
R 120) and very poor as earning monthly about $36 USD (R 60), as of 2008.  
9 According to Hall (2008), dwellings of groups of runaway slaves. 
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increasing household incomes with monthly stipends. The World Bank released an extensive 
baseline study of the Bolsa Família, supporting evidence of the benefits with a “3.6 percent 
increase in school attendance and lower drop-out rates of beneficiaries” (Hall, 2008 p. 808). The 
Bolsa Familia has been effective in providing financial support for the impoverished percentage 
of the population and investing into the improvement of Brazil’s human capital during a period 
when urban unemployment has risen. The program has also managed to play a key role in the 
reduction of absolute poverty and inequality, with urban pensions and other welfare programs 
significantly contributing to the reduction in inequality (Hall, 2008 p. 809). 
 The Bolsa Família, like other conditional cash transfer programs are fairly effective in the 
short-run, but critics of the programs are wary of the medium and long-run effects10 which are 
speculative. Criticisms of the Bolsa Família exist both from the international community and 
from within Brazil in the overall efforts of the program and the specific conditionality of it. On 
the internal level, Brazilians that oppose the program either oppose it because they believe that 
the money that is being used to fund it is better invested into the outdated educational system and 
infrastructures (Highfill, 2016). Or it is heavily opposed by the typically conservative led 
southern states who claim it is a way for the more liberal Worker’s Party to buy votes from the 
poor. Criticisms from the international community include concerns of possibilities of it 
fostering a sense of dependency on the government and it discouraging the search for formal 
employment (Highfill, 2016). The issue of dependency is one that developed countries have with 
foreign aid as well. Because the government is providing the extremely poor with a flat rate 
monthly stipend based on income, economists believe that there is the possibility that 
dependency on the stipend can become an issue.  
                                                 
10 For further information on the critiques of the Bolsa Família, refer to Hall (2008).  
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 Critics of the specific requirements of the program include development economists. 
Development economists are not necessarily against the Bolsa Família, but there is a debate as to 
whether a cash transfer program should be unconditional or tied to certain requirements 
(Highfill, 2016). If the program was based on unconditionality, some economists believe that the 
participants would use the money to fulfill their exact needs. The contrasting argument is that the 
“nudges” from aid organizations or the government typically are useful in that they overcome 
possible issues that are result of the poor’s lack of access to information (Highfill, 2016).  
 The possibility arises for criticism when there are specific issues within the actual 
construction and implementation of the program. Firstly, there is criticisms that the Bolsa 
Família is too narrow with its focus. Typical of cash transfer programs in Latin America, they 
target children of school age. The government ignores the fact that capital accumulation for 
children takes years to develop (Handa, Davis, 2006 p. 517) all the while ignoring the benefits of 
extending the program to adults above schooling age. The benefits of extending the program to 
reach adults past schooling age would be that the “accumulation of productive capital for the 
here and now that is, capital, such as land or non-agricultural assets, would have both long- and 
short-term effects on poverty alleviation” (Handa, Davis, 2006 p. 514). The objective of the 
Bolsa Família is poverty alleviation, by extending the reach of who is covered under the cash 
transfer, it would sustain the “impact of the cash transfer, which cannot continue indefinitely” 
(Handa, Davis, 2006 p. 518). Advocates believe that because the cash transfer program cannot 
cover participants past the medium term due to unsustainability and financing, including adults 
would extend the development of human capital. Secondly, for the poor, the Bolsa Família has a 
cap on the amount a family receives based on the number of school aged children. Concerns are 
that there are possibilities that this could lead to perverse incentives to have more children for a 
 24 
larger stipend (Handa, Davis, 2006 p. 521). This is especially applicable to the Bolsa Família 
because the implementation of the cash transfers are done by the municipalities. Who according 
to Handa and Davis, are haphazard at best and at the lower level are susceptible to corruption via 
beneficiary manipulation and measurement errors (2006 p. 523).  
 Although the Bolsa Família was significantly successful enough in Brazil that it attracted 
international and OECD institution attentions with its poverty alleviating results and wide-
reaching programs, there remain to be significant criticisms of it. President Lula’s administration 
was integral in constructing another program that would solve several of the issues that were 
mentioned above. 
 
1.5.2 Growth Acceleration Plan (PAC) 
 Another program that President Lula headed was a growth acceleration plan, otherwise 
known as PAC. PAC was targeted at public infrastructure in areas that had a predominantly poor 
population. Through investment in “building or rebuilding new homes and roads, and improving 
sanitation, sewage, water, and electrical services” (Carrasco, Williams, 2012 p. 107), President 
Lula hoped to bolster the economy. Lula managed to provide employment to the local population 
and improve the poor infrastructures that perpetuated a pattern of exclusion. President Lula 
extended the project to PAC II which focused on preparing infrastructures for the hosting of both 
the World Cup and the Olympics which were followed on a global scale (Carrasco, Williams, 
2012 p. 108). The goals of these programs were to improve the physical public infrastructure 
through the provisions of employment to boost the economy in poorer areas, improving the 
welfare of the community, therefore decreasing the poverty and income inequality.  
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1.5.3 Decade of Economic Growth   
 The decade of economic growth, as seen in Figure 2, that followed the recovery period in 
Brazil was vital to the decrease in the income inequality, measured by the GINI coefficient 
illustrated in Figure 3. Figure 2 shows that from 2002 to 2010, there was steady economic 
growth which supported development. Expansionary policy shows that with a decrease in taxes, 
there is an increase in the disposable income of domestic households which encourages those 
households to increase consumption, reinvesting capital back into the domestic economy. 
Domestic investment triggered economic growth which reassured investiture into the economy. 
That investment into the country can be used towards both the public or the private sector, as can 
be inferred from the success of the Bolsa Família, a portion of the investment went into the 
public sector, i.e. education, health care, social safety-net programs. During that same period, the 
income inequality (Figure 3) was steadily decreasing, which was a result of the economic growth 
and the Bolsa Familia. Figure 2 shows that to about 2008, there was a steady increase in GDP in 
Brazil and then there is short period of stagnation, presented in a plateau, and then an increase 
once again until 2010. After 2011, GDP clearly declines. That period of stagnation was the 
effects of the global financial crisis affecting Brazil. 
 
1.5.4 Global Financial Crisis 
 The spillover effects of the 2007-8 crisis, the Great Recession, were detrimental on a 
global scale. The collapse of the United States’ housing bubble and stock market affected 
economies that interacted in trade with the United States. Contrary to expectations, developed 
countries were affected more significantly than developing countries that were emerging 
economies like the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries. The impacts of the Great 
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Recession on Brazil were momentary. Consumption, exports, and investment declined which 
disturbed production, stagnating GDP (Arestis, Baltar, Prates, 2016 p. 158).  GDP stagnation was 
brief from 2009 to 2010 (Carrasco, Williams, 2012 p. 104), which can be observed in Figure 2. 
According to Carrasco and Williams, Brazil’s strong economic performance was attributable to 
several factors of the economy (2012 p. 104). Brazilian banks had less exposure to the U.S.’s 
securities-backed market than other countries and they benefitted from the Central Bank acting 
as a “central regulator” (Carrasco, Williams, 2012 p. 104). Another policy that was extremely 
beneficial for Brazil was that the enforcement of via capital controls, later in 2010. The 
combination of these policies protected Brazilian Banks so that they would not have to finance 
large sums of capital for the bailouts that the U.S. had to do for several of its major corporations. 
Brazil also boasted a low rate of unemployment and a low dependence on international trade, 
specifically with developed countries (Carrasco, Williams, 2012 p. 104). President Lula’s focus 
was on diversifying Brazil’s consumer profile which expanded its trade with China. The increase 
in Chinese imports compensated for the decline in domestic consumption (Arestis, Baltar, Prates, 
2016 p. 161) which was a direct result of the contagion from the Great Recession. Before the 
Great Recession, Brazil was experiencing an increase in consumption and a commodity boom 
(Cohen, 2013 p. 936) which was obviously affected by the global financial crisis, but Brazil’s 
counter-cyclical policy could readjust consumption to produce positive growth (Arestis, Baltar, 
Prates, 2016 p. 162). Although Brazil fared better than the United States at a faster recovery, it 
was not unscathed. The government nevertheless had to provide a stimulus package of 1.5 
percent to boost the economy (Carrasco, Williams, 2012 p. 105).  
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 In the period of Brazil’s recovery from the Great Recession, Brazil, like other Latin 
American countries11, decided to go against the conventional decision of employing austerity 
measures for an extended period of time. The expansionary measures, for the most part, were 
beneficial for Brazil’s economy, once again attracting foreign investments into the country in the 
hopes for higher returns (Cohen, 2013 p. 931).  The expansionary policies encouraged an 
increase in spending which, according to Cohen had a greater probability of maintaining 
aggregate demand and providing welfare programs and infrastructure on the micro level (2013 p. 
931). The expansionary measures constrained the Brazilian government in performing actively, 
successful fiscal policy, so there was a need to supplement with monetary policy, protecting the 
currency from the possibility of appreciation (Cohen, 2013 p. 940). Although there was much 
success in the expansionary policies that were employed, Brazil’s exports, GDP, consumption, 
and investment were negatively affected in the aftermath.  
 International competition increased and Brazil’s manufactured exports were undercut by 
China’s cheaper exports, while Brazil’s primary exports to China increased, resulting in a 
diminishing rate of export growth (Arestis, Baltar, Prates, 2016 p. 161). Throughout this period 
of depreciating growth of exports, Brazil’s consumption of imports from China increased 
worsening the current account deficit (Arestis, Baltar, Prates, 2016 p. 161). On top of the 
deteriorating trade balance, investment, consumption, and economic growth decreased. With the 
macroeconomic growth at a decline, in Brazil, income inequality increased. Poverty increased 
and deepened resulting in the poor’s recovery rate much slower than the rich. Brazil’s economy 
did not dwell on the contagion results of the Great Recession for long, by President Dilma 
                                                 
11 For further information on the negative effects of the Great Recession on Argentina’s and 
Mexico’s recovery, refer to Cohen (2013).  
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Rouseff’s election macroeconomic growth was increasing and the unemployment and inflation 
were low, providing a clear starting point for President ‘Dilma’. 
 
1.5.5 The 2010s 
 Immediately into her first term in 2010, President Dilma imposed currency controls on 
the Brazilian Real to defend against the influx of capital inflows in search of short-term gains 
(Cohen, 2013 p. 940). During her first term President Dilma’s main objective for the economy 
was to tackle a rising inflation rate while sustaining economic growth in the medium-run 
(“Dilma’s first big test,” 2011). The issue had been that the Real’s appreciation to uncomfortable 
levels for domestic manufacturers, had not tampered the steadily increasing inflation rate which 
was attributed to a low unemployment rate pushing the wages up resulting in an increase in the 
inflation rate (“Dilma’s first big test,” 2011). This was a complication for Dilma’s presidency 
because her predecessors, both President ‘Lula’ and President Cardoso, managed successful 
economic growth while tampering the high inflation rate. Using the central bank and the 
government’s fiscal policies to tighten controls on the economy President Dilma’s intentions 
were to slow down the economy. In 2011, the Central Bank’s role was a raising of its benchmark 
rate several times and to enforce new taxes on lending with stricter reserve requirements 
(“Dilma’s first big test,” 2011) to tamper down the expansionary efflux of lending. Dilma called 
for fiscal tightening due to the primary surplus increasing from tax revenues and the government 
spending at a significantly higher percentage than the previous year which has effected public 
investment negatively (“Dilma’s first big test,” 2011).  
 President Dilma was unsuccessful in sustaining economic growth in the medium-run 
during her first term, with growth averaging to only 2 percent at a time when the demand for 
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Brazil’s agricultural commodities has risen again (“Recession’s sharp bite,” 2015). The anemic 
economic growth of her first term and the government’s failed attempt at interventionist policy 
resulted in another recession for Brazil. Dilma’s “excessively loose monetary and fiscal policy, 
sapped confidence; investment dried up and inflation soared,” (“Recession’s sharp bite,” 2015) 
during her first term and GDP collapsed which can be seen in Figure 2. The collapse in the GDP 
cost at least 500,000 jobs (“Recession’s sharp bite,” 2015) and overall resulted in a demotion of 
Brazilian corporations by the S&P (“Recession’s sharp bite,” 2015) which was in accordance 
with worries for the economy and investments. Along with the poor performance of the market, 
the interest rate continued to increase for the public and private sector (“Recession’s sharp bite,” 
2015) discouraging industry and job creation. An expansion of the economy and the weakened 
currency had provoked the inflation rate to increase to high levels (“Recession’s sharp bite,” 
2015) which the government has been battling with contractionary interest rate increases. Figure 
4 demonstrates the interest rate throughout this period. The interest rate is measured in the period 
of 1997-2016. Although it is apparent in figure 4 that its trend is decreasing, there is a sharp 
increase approximately beginning in 2013 in the initial years of the recession. Both of President 
Dilma’s presidencies have been shrouded in corruption accusations against her and other party 
members in charge of the public sector and social welfare programs, most recently Petrobras, the 
largest energy corporation in Brazil. Ms. Dilma Rousseff was impeached in late 2016 and 
formally replaced by interim President Michel Temer until the end of her original term in 2019. 
President Temer’s term has recent but he has announced his intentions for structural reforms and 
pro-business policies that will once again attract international investors, turning Brazil into a 
more open and globalized economy.  
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 The medium-term and long-term effects of the political instability, combined with the 
recession, on poverty and income inequality from 2015 to currently are relatively unknown. But 
one can assume from trends that the recession in combination with the political corruption 
accusations and scandals that caused the impeachment had, was more significant than if either 
were independent occurrences. The recession has been believed to be the worst recession in 
Brazil’s history with the length of the recession and contractionary policies having a significant 
enough impact, deepening poverty to such an extent that it makes it more difficult for the 
impoverished to improve their conditions. President Tremer’s intended policies for increasing 
returns for foreign investments are shifting the country away from the political left like his 
predecessors President ‘Lula’ and President ‘Rouseff’ and back towards the right and 
neoliberalism with the possibility of the past mistakes returning.  
 
Conclusion 
 Over the span of 35 years, Brazil has witnessed crises and neoliberalism at its “finest”. 
The consequence of the neoliberal policies which were responses to the crises in the 1980s have 
altered the trajectory of Brazil’s income inequality. The primary neoliberal policy enforced on 
Brazil throughout the 1990s through the 2000s was the Washington Consensus. The Washington 
Consensus promoted capital flows which triggered hyperinflation and continued to exacerbate 
the current account deficit. The high volume of inflows, which is illustrated in figure 5 in the 
international transactions of Brazil was detrimental and because of Brazil’s economy not at the 
capacity to recover from the Global Financial Crisis, Brazil’s economy is experiencing an 
extended recession which is foreseen to last for several years more. The trajectory of income 
inequality corresponded to the wellbeing of the economy. In the decade of economic strong 
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economic growth, the government had the resource capabilities to focus on policies to reduce the 
inequality. During the crisis and the subsequent years, income inequality has begun to rise once 
more as Brazil’s economy is unstable and is experiencing a recession. As was demonstrated in 
this chapter, there is a relationship between the neoliberal’s Washington Consensus and the 
corresponding capital flow and income inequality.   
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Chapter 2 
Introduction 
 Neoliberal policies have dominated the political atmosphere since before the 1970s. In 
that, the policies that are being imposed by developed countries are neoliberal. Underlying the 
neoliberal policies are neoclassical theories that when put into practice, make apparent the flaws 
within the theories and the weak spots of an economy. The flaws of the neoliberal policies 
imposed on Brazil and Latin America without a forethought as to the impacts have proven to be 
detrimental and continuously more harmful for the economies. The main issue with neoliberal 
policies is that they are not specifically tailored to each economy in context, they are placed on 
all developing, emerging market economies without any specificity.  
 Further flaws will be identified using the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (1941) and the 
Factor Price Equalization Theorem, both underlying theories for trade policies. To offer an 
alternative, in a counterfactualized manner, Hyman P. Minsky’s Theory of Financial Fragility 
will be explored and the application of it on the global context, specifically Brazil. Minsky’s 
theory offers a brief policy suggestion that could in the future have beneficial effects for 
economies negatively impacted by capital flows.  
 
2.1 Flaws of Neoclassical Theories 
 Neoliberal agendas have been based on flawed theories in which the constructed models 
are not an accurate reflection of the “real world” economies meant to be represented. They 
illustrate unreliable depictions of relationships that occur within the global markets. In Lucas’ 
“Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?” (1990) he claims that the main 
objective of “all postwar [neoclassical] development policies is to stimulate transfers of capital 
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goods from rich to poor countries”. In the article, he readily calls attention to the severe flaws 
that exist within neoclassical policies with the oversimplification of theories. They make 
assumptions which would rightly complicate the models to represent reality. He uses a standard 
framework of the Cobb-Douglass production function consisting of a two-country model. Where 
both countries are producing the same good, have the same constant returns to scale and the 
same production function with capital and labor outputs (Lucas, 1990 p. 92). The only difference 
is in the production of labor. There are different levels of capital per worker, the Law of 
Diminishing Returns implies that the marginal product of capital is higher in the less productive 
country (Lucas, 1990 p. 92). Further, this implies that if trade and capital goods are free and 
competitive, then new investments will occur in the poorer economy which will hold true until 
the ratio between wages and capital returns are equalized (Lucas, 1990 p. 92). Through a 
simplified mathematical analysis of the Cobb-Douglas production function using the framework 
above, Lucas concludes that the model is inherently inaccurate in its reflection and its 
assumption that markets are free and complete. If the model held true, then there would be 
evidence of more capital flows, specifically investment, flowing from developed countries to 
developing. While there are a large volume of capital flows to developing countries, there 
remains to be a large volume flowing to developed countries in the form of remittances from 
FDIs and debt repayments. The purpose of Lucas’ article is to acknowledge the severe flaws 
within the typical neoclassical model. 
 
2.1.1 Flaws of Neoclassical Theory in Relation to Capital Flows 
 These flaws that Lucas (1990) concentrates on are evident in the World Bank’s chapter, 
“International Capital Flows and Economic Growth”. As a contextual structure to provide 
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evidence, the World Bank reiterates the neoclassical belief that there is a positive relationship 
between capital flows and domestic investment. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the relationship 
between the financial account which measures the total capital flows and total domestic 
investment. The reallocation of capital from industrial economies to developing can improve 
living standards by mobilizing global savings to finance investments in countries where the 
marginal productivity of investment is relatively high (Mishra, Mody, & Murshid, 2001 p. 60). 
Beneficial reallocations of capital occur in FDIs and foreign investment. FDIs and bank lending 
are associated with an increase in investment. Foreign investment can be supplementary to 
domestic savings (Mishra, Mody, & Murshid, 2001 p. 60). The World Bank’s chapter focuses on 
the analysis of the relationship between capital flows into developing nations and the domestic 
investment using the neoclassical theory. It supports the argument that capital flows into a 
developing country is meant to bolster domestic investment, which in turn should boost 
economic growth. But, a clear fallacy in this, through evidence of what occurs in practice 
between global and domestic markets, is that capital flows may boost growth often through 
consumption. The chapter is broad in that it is not focused on a specific region of developing 
countries, but it’s findings can be recognized in Brazil during the 1990s, especially in the years 
immediately following the Washington Consensus and the Real Plan of 1994. Data has shown in 
the past that long-term private capital flows are strongly and positively related to domestic 
investment. Neoclassical theory insists that there is a positive relationship between developing 
countries and domestic investment. But the World Bank challenges that predetermined notion, 
stating that the relationship has weakened over time. It pinpoints the decade in which the 
relationship had weakened to the 1990s with the advocating and coercion for financial 
liberalization, an aspect of the Consensus (Mishra, Mody, & Murshid, 2001 p. 59). A comparison 
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of the data in both figures demonstrates a negative relationship between the capital flows and 
investment especially during 2000-2013. 
 In figure 6, capital flows increased and then steadily decreased from the mid-2000s 
onwards. In figure 7, domestic investment declined and from the mid-2000s onwards, rapidly 
increased, providing evidence that the relationship between the two factors is negative, at least in 
Brazil. Figure 8 provides a more holistic picture of the relationship between the capital flows and 
the domestic investment. Figure 9 illustrates the gross capital formation which is a measurement 
of the net savings rate. It is another way to gauge the relationship between domestic investments 
and capital flows. If the capital formation is positive, then households have a higher savings rate 
and they can use that capital to invest in the domestic economy. In Brazil, the savings rate is 
increasing up until 2012 when the savings rate steadily declines with the presumed recession.  
 The way in which the economy interacts with capital flows is based on the absorptive 
capacity of the economy, which affects the resulting productivity from the degree of impact of 
the capital. It may result in volatility/spillover into other countries. To better understand capital 
flows and how they function within the economy one must consider their impact on investment. 
According to Feldstein (1994), there is an ambiguity to that relationship in that capital inflows 
prospectively may increase domestic investment. The downside is that instead the capital will 
increase imports which will decrease domestic production and therefore investment (Mishra, 
Mody, & Murshid, 2001 p. 60). One must also consider the possibility of capital inflows 
inducing capital outflows which is what occurred in Brazil and Latin America during the crises 
in the 1980s and 1990s. The previously positive relationship between capital inflows and 
domestic investment is due to the pre-liberalized economies, where almost the entirety of 
domestic savings was invested into the domestic economy. It induced outflows which were not 
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significant enough to offset the inflows, therefore the aggregate domestic investment reflected 
close to the full amount of inflows (Mishra, Mody, & Murshid, 2001 p. 61). In this case, there is 
a strong positive relationship between capital inflows and domestic investment, but this 
relationship is weakened when financial liberalization takes place. The relationship weakens 
when there is an increased incentive for capital outflows to finance projects domestically and 
globally, instead of financing the projects via the domestic savings coming from the capital 
inflows.  
 The absorptive capacity can be affected by several factors within the economy. For 
instance, the short-term capital flows are known to exist within a volatile market which “tend to 
perform their role of trade and bridging finance better in more stable situations” (Mishra, Mody, 
& Murshid, 2001 p. 62). The absorptive capacity of an economy is also impacted by the degree 
of development the economy has progressed to. Low income and developing countries have the 
most need for capital inflows, with low income countries relying heavily on FDIs as their capital 
inflows. According to the World Bank, the poorest countries receive a significantly limited 
amount of FDIs that are not consistently distributed evenly. Most of the FDIs that go to low 
income countries, flow towards resource abundant countries in oil and minerals (Mishra, Mody, 
& Murshid, 2001 p. 63). Resource abundant countries offer investors prospects of relatively 
higher yields than countries with less resources. Specifically in resources that are nonrenewable, 
the investors objectives are to gain stakes within the domestic companies that control the 
resources, generally state-owned. In the 1990s, the bulk of the FDIs were going to a select group 
of countries (Mishra, Mody, & Murshid, 2001 p. 63) whose economies offered opportunities of 
high yields which enticed investors from developed countries. Countries with low absorptive 
capacity are thosewith weak formal institutions. The financial markets are not well equipped to 
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deal with capital flows and FDIs domestically, resulting in weak productivity and little incentive 
for domestic firms to increase their productivity. Therefore, capital flows and FDIs do not 
present a significantly positive relationship to investment and productivity in low absorptive 
capacity countries. In high absorptive capacity countries like the East Asian countries, the 
expected positive relationship between FDIs and productivity is evident in the high productivity 
in foreign firms and the spillover effects into the domestic firms (Mishra, Mody, & Murshid, 
2001 p. 68). It is common knowledge that East Asian countries have created strong formal 
institutions and have governmental controls and policies in place which regulate their economies 
within highly productive trajectories. Therefore, the positive relationship that exists between 
capital flows (FDIs) and productivity only can exist if the economy has high absorptive 
capacities and offers relatively high yields from investment.  
 Last component of the analysis between the relationship, is the fact that capital flows are 
often associated with volatility. Volatility comes from the uncertainty that exists around 
prospective yields and consequences of entrepreneurial decisions. Capital flows are inherently 
volatile, but when financial markets are deregulated it opens the markets to increased flows and 
the hazards of increasing volatility, amplifying it within the domestic consumption and 
production (Mishra, Mody, & Murshid, 2001 p. 70 & 73). With the financial market 
liberalization imposed by the policies of the Washington Consensus, developing countries have 
increased their exposure to volatile capital flows intensifying the volatility of domestic 
consumption. This results in economic growth stemming from the consumption boom from the 
capital flows, which is what ensued as a result of the Real Plan in Brazil in 1994. The 
consumption boom facilitates further volatility within the financial market leading to a general 
instability within the economy in which speculative flows lead to investors fleeing from the 
 38 
market and the state selling all its reserves. Ultimately, causing a financial crisis, in 1999, the 
crisis in Brazil.  
 Neoclassical theories inherently have flaws in them which are exacerbated in the 
manifestation when they are imposed on countries. In theory, the flaws are avoidable, and pose 
little problem besides the fact that they are not accurately representative of what occurs in the 
economy in practice. To further understand the inherent flaws and the theories in the original 
context, the Stolper-Samuelson theory and the Factor Price Equalization Theorem are explained 
in deeper context. The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem is an underlying model for the Washington 
Consensus and the explanation of it furthers an understanding of the characteristics of the 
Washington Consensus. 
  
2.1.2 Stolper-Samuelson Theorem 
 Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson’s theorem of 1941 concluded that international 
trade leads to an increase in return on a country’s abundant factor and a decrease in return to its 
scarce factor. Their theoretical model was derived from the Heckscher-Ohlin model (1933). In 
Stolper-Samuelson’s article “Protection and Wages” (1941) they begin with several assumptions 
for which they apply to two cases proposed. They initially assume that the framework of the 
model is a two-country model, Country 1 and Country 2. Corresponding to the two countries, are 
two goods produced, Good A (“wheat”) and Good B (“watches”). Further in the theory, Stolper 
and Samuelson add several more assumptions to construct the model’s general parameters. (1) 
the country in question is relatively small and has no influence on the terms of trade, (2) the 
removal of the duty (of the terms of trade) does not destroy formerly protected industries, but 
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contracts them instead, (3) the country in question is relatively well supplied in capital, and  (4) 
the proportion of labor to capital in production is lower in wheat than watches12.  
 The two cases that Stolper-Saumelson propose are opposing in views, but ultimately 
reach the same conclusion, that international trade is beneficial for a country’s abundant factor. 
The two cases are as follows, where the wage good is also the good whose production capital is 
relatively important (1941 p. 62). In Case 1, wheat is the wage good. Introducing trade into the 
country will shift the production by increasing the exportation of wheat. This results in the 
contraction of the less competitive good’s production (Stolper, Samuelson, 1941 p. 64). There 
will be a transfer of both labor and capital from the watch industry to the wheat industry. This 
will lead to an increase of the amount of labor available to the wheat industry. In response to the 
abrupt abundance in labor, there will be a decrease in the wheat’s real wage rate, resulting in a 
decrease in the real wage. In this instance, Stolper and Samuelson discredit classical theory 
which in this case, the decrease in productivity would increase the price of the export, the wage 
good (Stolper-Samuelson, 1941 p. 66). In Case 2, watches are the good whose production labor 
is relatively important. The introduction of trade increases the production of watches and 
decreases the production of wheat. Emphasis in this case is on watches, and with the decrease in 
production of wheat, there is a transfer of capital from the wheat industry to the watch industry 
(Stolper, Samuelson, 1941 p. 65).  
 
 
 
                                                 
12  Author only includes certain assumptions, Stolper-Samuelson includes several more 
assumptions. For the remaining assumptions not included see Stolper, Samuelson (1941) paper in 
bibliography, for the specific equation.  
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2.2.1 Application of the Stolper-Samuelson  
 Both cases that were proposed by Stolper and Samuelson conclude that international 
trade leads to an increase in return on a country’s abundant factor and a decrease in return of its 
scarce factor (1941 p. 58). This base model can be applied to modern economies, using the 
factors of production of skilled labor, unskilled labor, and capital. In developed countries, skilled 
labor and capital are abundant factors, conversely, in developing countries, unskilled labor is the 
abundant factor (“The Heckscher-Ohlin”, 2012/2016). The implication that this has is that 
increased international trade leads to an increase in the returns to the unskilled labor in the 
developing country (“The Heckscher-Ohlin”, 2012/2016). 
 Based off of the conclusion, the increased capital gains in the unskilled sector of the 
industry can be used by the firms for investments into the labor force, public sector and 
technology to become more capital intensive. The investments should focus on education, 
healthcare, infrastructure, and social safety nets; sectors that can help decrease poverty and close 
the gap between the skilled labor and unskilled labor in the country. In theory, investments 
targeted at the middle and low income groups should decrease the gap within a developed and 
developing country in technology, income, and growth. By decreasing the gap, it triggers 
economic growth which is a catalyst for economic development. This is the general basis for the 
conclusion that Kaldor’s extension on Solow’s Convergence Theorem, where developing 
countries should “catch up” with developed countries, when the developed countries reach the 
steady state13. 
 
 
                                                 
13 For further information regarding Kaldor’s extension of the Solow model, see Kaldor 
(1956/1957) 
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2.2.2 Application of the Stolper-Saumelson to Brazil 
 The application of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem to Latin America has been quite 
flawed on the basis that the results of the Washington Consensus were not beneficial for Brazil. 
But rather, beneficial for the USA, Europe, IMF, World Bank, China, and others. Neoclassical 
theories underlie the Consensus’ ten policy recommendations. A policy suggestion of the 
Consensus was trade liberalization, opening the country to international trade by eliminating 
barriers through the decrease in tariffs on imported goods (Kregel, 2008). Trade liberalization is 
a recommendation that encourages Brazil, an emerging market economy (EME) to further 
engage in trade with developed countries and institutions. Generally, a characteristic of 
developing countries is that they are relatively abundant in labor, specifically unskilled labor and 
relatively scarce in capital and scarce labor. The abundant factor, unskilled labor is used to 
produce exports for the region. The scarce factor, capital is used to purchase imports for the 
country (“The Heckscher-Ohlin,” 2012/2016). Basically, capital is used to not only purchase 
physical goods and services, but to invest in technology and physical capital that will increase 
innovation and growth.  
 When enacting free trade, prices change dependent on the abundant factor and the scarce 
factor. Based on this, the abundant factor’s returns will increase and the scarce factor’s return 
will fall with the result being that the abundant factor always benefits from free trade (“The 
Heckscher-Ohlin,” 2012/2016; Stolper, Samuelson, 1941 p. 58). According to the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem, the labor in Brazil should benefit far more than the capital owners 
(capitalists) who should have a decrease in profits. This is because Brazil’s relative abundance in 
labor and relative scarcity in capital and developed countries they are engaged in trade with, have 
a relative abundance in capital and a relative scarcity in labor. Conversely, in developed 
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countries the capitalists should gain and there should be an increase in profits while the laborers 
or workers should see a decrease in wages. Concluding that the abundant factor in the country 
will benefit despite the industry. This is fundamentally a matter of gains and losses in purchasing 
power (“The Heckscher-Ohlin,” 2012/2016).  
 Because a country’s abundant factor is used to produce exports and the scarce factor to 
purchase goods that are imported, the introduction of free trade results in the price of a country’s 
exports to decrease. Simultaneously, there is an increase in the price of imports. Conversely, an 
increase in price of exports will incentivize firms to expand production with the possibility for an 
increase in profit in the good in the future. There is a simultaneous decrease in the price of 
imports which will result in firms reducing production of the good due to increased competition, 
and vice versa (“The Heckscher-Ohlin,” 2012/2016). The Stolper-Samuelson says that the 
abundant good will be in higher demand. An excess demand for the abundant factor increases the 
price of the good and an excess supply of the scarce factor will decrease the price of the scarce 
good. This results in an increase in the abundant factor’s returns and a decrease in the scarce 
factor’s returns (“The Heckscher-Ohlin,” 2012/2016).  
 Furthering the application of the theorem on Brazil, when there is a shift towards trade 
liberalization, the expected result is that the exported good’s production will expand and the 
import-competing good’s production will be reduced. Resulting from an increase in demand for 
the abundant factor (labor), the expansion of exports is due to the nature of the production being 
labor intensive. Applied theoretically to Brazil, the result should be a negative relationship 
between the demand for labor and the demand for capital. The demand for labor increases and 
the demand for capital decreases. Eventually this causes an increase in the price of labor with a 
corresponding increase in the wages of workers and decrease in the price for capital or the gains 
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for capitalists. A shift in the income distribution should be the result, with the wage share and the 
capital share reaching a split that is closer to 0.5 and 0.514. Surprisingly to the economists and 
policy makers of the Washington Consensus, the effects of free trade did not reflect the 
presumed conclusions of the theorem. Stolper and Samuelson concluded that international trade 
is beneficial for a country’s abundant factor, leading to an increase in the production and the 
gains from trade. Another theorem that is underlying the Washington Consensus and all trade 
agreements for free trade is the Factor Price Equalization Theorem.  
 
2.3 Factor Price Equalization Theorem 
 The Factor Price Equalization Theorem is most commonly utilized in the debates for 
international trade agreements, most recently heard in debates for the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (“The Heckscher-Ohlin,” 2012/2016). The basic conclusion for this 
theorem is that enacting free trade leads to the equalization of wages and rents, globally. But it is 
contingent upon the assumption that countries possess the same level of technology and that the 
markets that exist are perfectly competitive. These assumptions make apparent the disparities in 
the level of technological development among countries. Especially between low income 
countries and high income countries, as well as countries that remain in the middle income trap. 
There is also need to acknowledge the fact that the global markets are not perfectly competitive.  
 Breaking down the model, perfect competition allows for wages to be directly related to 
marginal productivity, which is dependent on the price of goods. When there are variations in 
prices among countries, the results are differing marginal productivities. By turning to free trade 
policies, prices, marginal productivities, and wages are equalized (“The Heckscher-Ohlin,” 
                                                 
14 For further explanation regarding the actual split in the wage share and the capital share see, 
1= 1−∝ −∝ 
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2012/2016). The specific conditions that are necessary to fulfill make the Factor Price 
Equalization Theorem increasingly difficult to apply across a panel of countries that are not in 
similar income brackets as the other. The results are that the disparities among countries 
becomes more obvious. The authors of The Heckscher-Ohlin (Factor Proportions) Model 
(2012/2016) propose that it be applied with an interpretation of the theorem in a way that 
expresses factor prices moving together when free trade is enacted.  
  
2.3.1 Application of the Factor Price Equalization Theorem 
 It has already been pointed out that the Factor Price Equalization Theorem is not 
applicable in its originally intended context to the “real world” setting. It is common that most 
developing countries, aside from East Asian countries, have not attained the level of technology 
and innovation that is apparent in developed economies. The track of technological advancement 
differs dependent on the type of economy, i.e. net exporter or net importer. The other assumption 
that restricts the ability of the applicability of the theorem is perfect competition. In the modern 
capitalist society, perfect competition is not at all realistic to the conditions that are present in 
today’s economy. The implications that this theorem has on income inequality, if it were to be 
perfectly applicable to the situation, were that the disparity present between developing and 
developed countries would cease to exist. Therefore, an implication of the inapplicability of the 
Factor Price Equalization Theorem is that there is no convergence, defined in Kaldor’s Model, in 
the level of technology among countries. In practice, applying policies that enact this theorem 
will perpetuate the income inequality that is already apparent between countries. The Factor 
Price Equalization Theorem states that there will be an equalization of wages and rents when 
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countries engage in free trade. When it was applied to Brazil and other developing countries, the 
desired results were not attained.  
 
2.4 Effects of Stolper-Samuelson and Factor Price Equalization Theorem in Brazil 
 Both theorems produced policies that have been forced upon developing countries, like 
Brazil in the late 20th to the 21st century via the Washington Consensus. Following the debt crisis 
in the 1980s the results in Brazil were relatively negative. There was a brief period of “recovery” 
which the countries were accumulating foreign exchange reserves for stabilization 
simultaneously while they were assuming compounding debt (Kregel, 2008* p. 8). The 
accumulation of debt was significant enough that it rapidly became unsustainable once again and 
the theory of loaning capital to countries that are using the capital to pay off pre-existing loans, 
makes for a volatile financial economy. This easily led to an environment where any magnitude 
of a negative shock would easily cause investors to speculatively pull out their investments, 
which would trigger a rush of capital out of the countries with foreign and domestic investors 
moving capital out of Brazil. In response, the government would sell their foreign exchange 
reserves, unwilling to be saddled with more debt in other stronger currencies that they were 
unable to repay (Kregel, 2008* p. 9). These capital flow reversals ultimately led to contagion and 
crises rapidly succeeding one another with the crises in the emerging market economies.  
 Ultimately, there were inherent flaws within both the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and 
the Factor Price Equalization Theorem and when applied to developing countries like Brazil, the 
flaws manifested. Both theories advocate for trade liberalization. But in the case of Brazil, 
imposing trade liberalization, reform, and capital liberalization too soon after the debt crisis and 
with weak institutions, the result was increased economic vulnerability to external shocks. 
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Proving that although Brazil was classified as an emerging market economy when the policies 
were imposed on it, its economic development was not advanced enough to be able to combat 
the detrimental natures of the policies. Hyman P. Minsky offers an alternative to the mainstream 
neoclassical theory. His theory is constructed based on the functioning of the economy in 
practice and what he witnessed. Several economists apply his theory to the global context which 
offers an alternative, counterfactual to the Brazil, beginning with the debt crisis in the 1980s.  
  
2.5 Minsky’s Theory of Financial Fragility 
 Hyman Minsky founded a theory that if given more credence, would have been more 
useful to Brazil and the other middle-income countries in the 1980s and 1990s. It could have 
possibly altered the trajectory of Brazil and the other developing countries. Minsky’s theory is an 
attempt to explain the impact of debt on system behavior and incorporates the manner in which 
debt is validated (Minsky, 1992 p. 6). Minsky’s Theory of Financial Instability or Fragility is 
based first and foremost on Keynes’ work in the General Theory. There are two conclusions of 
his theory: (1) the reasons for periodic crises is that there is an inability of firms to repay their 
debts in the financial sector, (2) the business cycle is basically a cycle of financial systems 
becoming increasingly fragile (Beshenov, Rozmainsky, 2015 p. 424).  
 In his theory, Minsky identifies three types of financial firms, hedge, speculative and 
Ponzi (Wolfson, 2002 p. 394). Ranging from the most risk averse borrowers and lenders, 
gradually increased to the riskiest borrowers and lenders. According to Minsky, hedge financing 
unit is when the expected income from a company’s operations is predicted to be sufficient 
enough to meet the payment commitment on debt. Hedge financing units dominate the financial 
market during periods of recovery (Beshenov, Rozmainsky, 2015 p. 423). Speculative financing 
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is defined as when a company’s income is not sufficient to cover both the present principle 
amount and the interest amount. For the firm to meet the payment commitment would need to 
contract new short-term loans. Speculative financing firms are predominant in periods of booms, 
i.e. the consumption boom (Beshenov, Rozmainsky, 2015 p. 424). Both hedge and speculative 
financing are considered to be valid forms of financing units within a period of economic success 
so long as speculative firms continue to refinance their positions (Minsky, 1977 p. 25). Higher 
interest rates increase the amount of the payment commitment for speculative financiers due to 
the increase in both the interest amount owed on the initial after refinancing. But higher interest 
rates do not guarantee an increase in the returns on the assets (Minsky, 1977 p. 25). Firms that 
are speculative borrowers are vulnerable in that (1) there is a necessity to continue to meet the 
market to refinance and to successfully maintain the loans. (2) The market value of assets can 
become smaller than the value of their debts (Minsky 1977 p. 25), which can be from the 
increase in both long-term and short-term interest rates which negatively affects assets more so 
than liabilities due to the short-term nature of liabilities. (3) Minsky mentions the subjectivity of 
acceptable structures and with a “shortfall of cash receipts relative to cash payment commitments 
anywhere in the economy” (1977 p. 25) the result can be a revaluation of the structures.  
 The third type of financing unit that Minsky introduces is a Ponzi unit. A Ponzi firm is 
the riskiest, where the firm is unable to pay both the principle and the interest and therefore must 
continue to accumulate and refinance loans to repay debt, without restrictions or reforms 
(Wolfson, 2002 p. 394). Ponzi units or capitalization of interests (Minsky, 1986 p. 8) always lead 
to recessions (Beshenov, Rozmainsky, 2015 p. 424). Minsky considers that “stability induces 
instability” (Minsky, 1986 p. 15). A highly stable financial structure always progresses to an 
unstable structure. In the recovery period when hedge financing units dominate, little time has 
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passed and both lenders and borrowers are cognizant of the crisis or recession that just occurred. 
As time progresses, lenders and borrowers become less risk averse with the forgotten times of 
economic contraction. Inherent in the structure is that the previous events are easily forgotten 
and lenders and borrowers gradually progress to decreasingly risk averse.  
 High or increasing interest rates can turn hedge units into speculative units, and 
speculative units into Ponzi units. Increasing the degree of risk in the financing of debt within an 
economy, brings about instability and can cause a financial crisis and/or lead to a recession. A 
Ponzi finance units leads can lead to a crisis when eventually the financing units are unable to 
attain new loans because either the risk for lenders is too high or there is lack of financial 
resources in the economy (Beshenov, Rozmainsky, 2015 p. 424). To continue to pay off their 
debt, financing units can sell or pledge their productive assets to gain liquid capital which leads 
to a decrease in demand price. With the fall in demand price, investment levels will decrease and 
this will lead to a crisis (Beshenov, Rozmainsky, 2015 p. 424). This crisis is further exacerbated 
when there is an excessive borrower risk. When there is an excessively high borrower risk, 
investments decrease, and demand prices for assets fall below the supply price (Beshenov, 
Rozmainsky, 2015 p.424). When demand price for assets has fallen below the supply price, this 
halts the investment process altogether.  
 Alternatively, a crisis can be brought about when the financial weakness becomes 
apparent to investors and there is an unwillingness to finance certain organizations and sectors of 
the economy. Unless the government invests into the domestic economy to offset the loss in 
foreign investments, the results are a decrease in investment and profits. Making it difficult for 
firms, banks and the government to maintain the degree of debt that is being borrowed, 
pressuring firms to lower the debt ratio which can cause a panic (Minsky, 1977 p. 25). This panic 
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is caused by the debt-deflation which happens soon after interest rates shift speculative units 
towards Ponzi units. The debt-deflation process occurs when there are defaults on debt payments 
which decrease aggregate demand. It decreases prices and increase the real value of the 
outstanding debt payment commitment resulting in the acceleration of the economy’s downward 
spiral (Wolfson, 2002 p. 397).   
 Within Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, he includes several policy suggestions. 
He is an advocate for structuring into the financial system ‘lender of the last resort’ which is 
controlled by the Central Banks as an interventionist method. In crises, he promotes an active 
role of the government in employing both expansionary macroeconomic, monetary and fiscal 
policies. In this he acknowledges that an issue with these types of policies would be that they 
“lull both firms and banks into a false sense of security” and that the result often is stagflation 
(Beshenov, Rozmainsky, 2015 p. 424). Paired with lender of the last resort, Minsky also 
advocates for government deficits and government controlled regulations on capital and 
investments (Minsky, 1986 p. 23).   
 
2.5.1 Financial Fragility Applied to the Global Context 
 When Minsky was working on his Theory of Financial Fragility, the context of this was 
set in the domestic economy of the United States. Since then economists have worked to apply 
his theory to the global context. Martin H. Wolfson is an economist who attempts to make 
Minsky’s theory applicable to the global context as an explanation of financial crises. The 
application of Minsky to the global markets included the observation that money can flow from 
one country to another in the form of capital flows which are linked to investments and loans. 
The neoliberal agendas in the 1990s introduced the decision to increase the reliance on capital 
 50 
flows and privatization in developing countries to create assets to trade (Cornford, Kregel, 1996 
p. 13) which has increased the possibility for Minsky’s proposed financial instability and resulted 
in crises. In the 1990s, the recession in the United States and other developed countries resulted 
in the falling interest rate and capital flows to developing countries in Latin America and Asia 
(Wolfson, 2002 p. 395). In these countries, speculative and Ponzi units made up most firms 
within the domestic economies. Most relying on the domestic borrowing at relatively low short-
term rates and lending at relatively high long-term rates in the foreign markets (Wolfson, 2002 p. 
396). The foreign market collapsed when there was, according to Minsky a “not unusual” event. 
The “not unusual” event was defined by Minsky (1977) as the “forced selling of assets to raise 
cash and a sharp fall in the prices of the assets” (Wolfson, 2002 p. 396). This “not unusual” event 
paired with the falling exchange rate led to a debt-deflation process on the global level, in which 
the exchange rate decreased resulting in borrower’s inability to meet debt payment commitments 
in hard currency, increasing loan default. Because loans were not renegotiated, there was an 
unreliability in the markets and investors fled to protect their investments which further 
depressed the exchange rate. This exact scenario occurred in the 1990s in the emerging market 
crises which spread more expediently via contagion from the removal of capital controls and the 
financial deregulation. The removal of capital controls and financial deregulation were part of 
mandatory policies that were enforced on developing countries. Paired with a lack of regulation 
and lack of laws limiting foreign financial investment, permitted the spiral towards financial 
fragility and increased the likelihood of financial crises. 
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2.5.2 Financial Fragility Applied to Brazil 
 Minsky’s theory could have been applied in the years following the 1994 Real Plan. 
Brazil’s economy experienced another crisis in 1999 which was a result of contagion and the 
financial fragility within the economy. The Brady Plan in 1992 reintegrated Brazil back into the 
global financial markets which the Real Plan benefitted from, which was partially the reason for 
its initial success. While it was successful, it created an imbalance of payments. The capital 
flows that went with the imbalance of payments affected the financial conditions due to the 
absence of inflation from the government’s sterilization policy creating a “negative carry”. 
Negative carry is defined as being a situation in which the cost of the investment exceeds the 
returns on that given investment (“Negative Carry,”n.d.), exacerbating the current budget deficit 
(Kregel, 2000 p. 4). The sharp decline in the inflation rate resulted in increases in consumption 
and Brazil experiencing a consumption boom in which banks were forced to lend aggressively to 
domestic consumers which further fueled the boom. The boom preceded the 1999 crisis, 
artificially stimulated the economy and earned incomes. It was meant to stimulate domestic 
investment to encourage growth. With the consumption boom, the Brazilian economy was left 
more vulnerable to external shocks.  
 Within Wolfson’s proposed framework, the implications on the income distribution are 
different than the relationship between free trade and income inequality as the neoclassicals 
theorize. As the neoclassicals theorize, globalization, i.e. free trade, capital flows, is a step that 
produces economic development and growth. Most developing economies utilize this concept to 
construct their development processes. Globalization includes capital flows and investment 
which are used to invest in technology and in the public sector, i.e. infrastructure, education, 
healthcare, social safety nets, all factors which aid in decreasing income inequality.  
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 According to Wolfson, theoretically, capital controls paired with other economic policies 
can mitigate either the harmful effects of a crisis or, given the policies, can bypass a crisis. 
Handa and Davis on crises consider that a feature of recessions and crises is that the poor 
become even poorer and the number of near poor or lower middle class families drop into 
poverty (Handa, Davis, 2006 p. 518). As can be observed from the past 35 years in Brazil, capital 
flows eventually lead to a recession or crisis and as a result, the income distribution is widened 
further. Capital controls have been beneficial preventative measures that in some ways mitigate 
some of the additive harmful effects of the crisis or recession. 
 
Conclusion 
 Brazil’s heavy reliance on capital flows required high interest rates to keep the exchange 
rate stable. While the inflation rate was rapidly declining, there was a real appreciation of the 
Real (Kregel, 2000). The appreciation of the Real simultaneously with the return of capital, 
resulted in the economy’s vulnerability which Brazil attempted to combat with high interest 
rates. Along with the return of capital inflows in the 1990s, Brazil quickly found an increasing 
proportion of their public debt owned by foreigners. This resulted in much of the external and 
domestic debt being indexed to the overnight domestic rate (Kregel, 2000) which was a threat of 
instability to the economy. The required high interest rates induced a deterioration in the fiscal 
and foreign balances, which created doubts in the viability of the policy (Kregel, 2000). With the 
doubts of future success, investors fled and it resulted in a reversal of capital flows and the 
exchange rate to fall. The economic instability that Brazil was combatting was negatively 
impacted by the contagion from the crises in the East Asian countries, making it more 
susceptible to a crisis of its own which is exactly what occurred in Brazil in 1999.  
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 Increasing international trade/capital in a recovery period, which is what the Stolper-
Samuelson and the Factor Price Equalization Theorem promote, has been more harmful to 
Brazil, than beneficial. In developing countries with weak institutions, capital flows only serve to 
exacerbate any issues within the economy. 
 Leading up to the 1980s, financial institutions in Latin American countries were mostly 
Ponzi units, where their continual accumulation of debt was unrestricted by their government or 
other institutions. Then in the recovery period, the Brady Plan and the Washington Consensus 
promoted the reintegration into the foreign capital markets, as a way to refinance their initial debt 
for repayment. This allowed for the countries to continue to accumulate more debt on top of the 
pre-existing, that was from the debt crisis while simulating conditions of economic recovery, a 
period in which investors and borrowers forgot the conditions of the previous crisis. Ultimately, 
this led to capital flow reversals resulting in the rapid succession of crises. The main policy 
conclusion that Wolfson and Minsky come to, is the necessity of having restrictions on the 
accumulation of debt by way of capital flows. This was not a factor leading up to the crises at the 
end of the 20th century. Restrictions on the amount of capital accumulated would have been 
beneficial for the economies in that influxes of capital flows often leads to economic instability 
in developing countries.  
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Chapter 3 
Introduction 
 Based on the fact that Brazil is the largest economy in Latin America and has one of the 
largest disparities in the income distribution globally, the attention it received in the past is 
momentous. It has resulted from the perpetuation of inequality from the colonial period. In the 
period since the Washington Consensus income inequality has reduced relatively significantly. 
Because of Brazil’s history with neoliberal policies, it is a valid claim that there should be 
consideration of the impacts of capital flows and the restricting/loosening of capital controls 
have on income inequality. 
 Much of the literature considers only the domestic factors as mechanisms that impacted 
the decline in income inequality in Brazil. With little mention of the effects global factors may 
have on the income inequality directly or indirectly. This chapter is complementary to the 
previous chapters. The effects of capital flows and capital controls are analysed utilizing the 
general models and frameworks applied to Brazil. Ultimately, it analyses the relationship 
between the capital flows that the neoclassical policies of the Consensus promoted which were 
commonly believed to have positive effect on the development and in turn a positive effect on 
the income distribution in Brazil.  
 
3.1 Effects of Financial Liberalization and Capital Controls on Income Inequality 
 Capital affects the income distribution. How it affects is the income distribution is 
dependent on factors within the economy, i.e. the depth of financial integration, liberalization 
and development within a given economy. The mainstream neoclassical belief is that capital 
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flows are beneficial to income inequality. They inject foreign investment into a developing 
economy which is used to invest into technology and for domestic projects. As well as to 
encourage economic growth using foreign direct investment as a catalyst for domestic 
investment. 
 
3.1.1 Effects of Financial Liberalization on Income Inequality 
 Capital account liberalization may have a negative effect on growth because it often 
causes conditions for financial instability in emerging markets (Lagarda, Linares, Gallagher, 
2017 p. 1). The Washington Consensus was imposed solely on emerging market economies, 
middle income economies amid development of foundational structures of the economy, i.e. 
institutions. Financial liberalization was an essential condition of the Consensus which promoted 
capital inflows and financial integration. The process of financial liberalization itself was not 
detrimental to these countries, but the effects of the liberalization were. During liberalization, 
economies became increasingly vulnerable to external shocks, they were more susceptible to the 
resulting damages from them.  
 This is what occurred in South Korea, which facilitated the contagion of a crisis from 
Thailand to the East Asian countries. Thailand’s Baht was being devalued and as a result, 
investors were fleeing from what was once a haven’t for capital flows. The results of investors 
fleeing from the Asian countries, created a  contagion affect in East Asia. It started with South 
Korea and the bailouts of big corporations, which resulted from the spillover of Thailand’s 
economic instability while South Korea was transitioning to a more financially liberalized 
system. The financial liberalization forced South Korea to increase its financial openness and 
dependency on foreign capital inflows. Because of the economic instability in Thailand, 
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investors therefore fled from the remaining East Asian countries which is the outbreak for the 
East Asian Crisis in 1997.  
 In this period, the East Asian countries were in the process of transitioning to a more 
liberalized financial atmosphere in alignment with the policies and agendas of liberalism in the 
West. Their development towards this state left them unprepared and less flexible to the altered 
economic environment resulting from the shock. In an economic crisis the disparity in the 
income distribution is exacerbated (Lagarda, Linares, Gallagher, 2017 p. 25), which is what is 
evident in countries that were affected by the Global Financial Crisis. The middle and bottom 
income shares do not have the same resources available to recover quickly while the top income 
shares’ wealth can be utilized to cushion the contraction of the economy. Therefore, the 
inequality deepens as the lower income shares continue to grapple with decreases or loss of 
incomes.  
 According to Bumann and Lensink, the impact of financial liberalization on income 
inequality is that it will improve the distribution (2016 p. 144). This is only applicable in 
countries where the financial depth is high. In countries where the financial depth is low, interest 
rate elasticity of demand for loans is low. This leads to an “increase in the bank efficiency, and 
the related decrease in borrowing costs will only have a minor impact on loan demand” 
(Bumann, Lensink, 2016 p. 144). According to the authors, the “financial market equilibrium 
requires a decrease in the deposit rate which reduces the income of savers and consequently 
increases income inequality” (Bumann, Lensink, 2016 p. 144). In the case of countries with high 
financial depth, the opposite scenario is what occurs. In high financial depth countries, the 
interest rate elasticity of demand for loans is high leading to an increase in the deposit rate which 
increases the income of savers and therefore the income inequality. The implication for most 
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developing countries with low financial depth is that capital account liberalization will increase 
the income inequality (Bumann, Lensink, 2016 p. 161).  
 According to Das and Mohapatra, there is a positive, statistically significant relationship 
between liberalization and income shares of the upper quintile. The middle class is negatively 
associated with liberalization (2003 p. 219). There is no statistically significant relationship 
between the lowest quintile shares and liberalization. This demonstrates that there is 
simultaneously an increase in the income distribution and a “squeezing out” of the middle class. 
Liberalization seems to simulate a recession where the incomes of the lowest middle quintiles are 
falling, with the financial conditions of the quintile falling into the lower quintile. Although the 
“pie grew” (Das, Mohapatra, 2003 p. 220) the wealth was disproportionally reallocated.   
 In developing countries where institutions and financial development are relatively 
weaker, financial liberalization comes with more risk. Concerns regarding liberalization included 
the effects of promoting capital flows into economies which are transitioning, and introducing 
more effective laws and institutions. In the instance of a contractionary external shock, the 
economy is increasingly vulnerable to the spillover effects or the contagion brought on by the 
shocks amid liberalization. Financial liberalization leave the economy open to increased damage 
due to capital flight as investors speculate against the economy’s health. This results are 
institutions struggling to enforce effective laws and policies to combat the contraction of the 
economy, as was seen in the East Asian crisis and the emerging market crises of the 1990s. 
Financial liberalization itself does not necessarily have a negative effect on income inequality, 
but it is a facilitator for economic factors that exacerbate the income distribution.  
 
3.1.2 Effects of Capital Controls on Income Inequality  
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 Based on the neoclassical theories in the previous chapter, neoclassical economists 
believe that capital controls are beneficial. They promoted capital flows with the belief that they 
would stimulate economic growth, encouraging increased participation in the global economy 
and economic development. Foreign capital flows as an investment opportunity into the domestic 
economy would provide economic stability in economies that had experienced lasting periods of 
economic instability.  
 Capital controls are restrictions placed on the inflows of foreign capital. According to 
Azis and Shin (2015), almost all emerging market economies enforce capital controls either 
directly or indirectly when there is a large volume of foreign capital inflows. These restrictions 
are either in the direct form of taxes or indirectly through a sterilized market intervention (Azis, 
Shin, 2015 p. 85). Either way, their main goal is to restrict the amount of capital inflows into the 
economy because a high volume of capital flows into a developing economy, in certain 
circumstances is not necessarily beneficial. Especially in weak countries, governments use 
capital controls “because foreign borrowing could undermine the government’s ability to control 
domestic funds and exchange rates” (Bumann, Lensink, 2016 p. 144). 
 There are concerns that the inflows will cause the exchange rate to appreciate, resulting 
in a loss of competitiveness of exports in the global market. In which the appreciation can have 
lasting damages on certain industries (Chamon, Garcia, 2016 p. 164). There may also be 
concerns in the utilization of the foreign capital in the domestic economy. Foreign capital is most 
beneficial when it is used in domestic projects that target the social welfare, and for technology 
(Chamon, Garcia, 2016 p. 164). That is not to say that foreign capital is immediately used in 
these sectors.  
 In circumstances of high volume, capital controls restrict the inflows. This includes 
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income flows which are concentrated in the top income shares of the economy, as these agents 
are more closely connected to the financial market. As a result, they reap the benefits of an 
increase (decrease) in the money supply first. In the case of a decrease in the money supply, 
these agents are made aware of the decrease first and as such, they are better prepared for the 
effects of it. Capital controls are a useful tool that also restricts the concentration of flows into 
the top income shares, protecting the bottom and middle income shares from harmful after 
effects of capital on the domestic economy.  
 Lagarda, Linares and Gallagher surmise that capital controls are more beneficial for high 
income countries who have strong institutions capable of adapting to possible external shocks 
and are financially developed (2012 p. 25). But, the implication of this is that countries who have 
weak institutions cannot effectively enact capital controls as policy measures to counteract or 
proactively protect the domestic economy. In contrast to neoclassical economists, there are 
several economists who advocate for capital controls to be used to maintain the global economies 
health. Capital controls have become effective macroeconomic policy tools to use in 
circumstances when the volume of foreign capital flowing into a domestic economy is 
overwhelming and unsustainable for emerging market economies like Brazil.  
 
3.2 Effects of Capital Flows and Capital Controls on Income Inequality in Brazil 
 The effects of capital flows and capital controls on income inequality in Brazil have been 
influenced by the policies of the Washington Consensus in which Brazil and other emerging 
market economies were required to increase financial openness, financially liberalize, and re-
integrate into the global economy. Brazil reassumed its outstanding debt from the debt crisis in 
the 1980s in addition to managing the high volume of capital flows which were due to the high 
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interest rates that were maintained to combat the high domestic inflation rate. The Washington 
Consensus policies and economists promoted capital flows which were attracted by the 
possibility for high yields from hyperinflation driven high interest rates.  
 
3.2.1 Effects of Capital Controls on Income Inequality During the Global 
Financial Crisis in Brazil 
 When there is a high concentration of capital inflows into emerging market economies, 
their response is to impose restrictions on the foreign capital either directly or indirectly (Azis, 
Shin, 2015 p. 85). Because of the Global Financial Crisis, and as a preventative macroeconomic 
tool, Brazil imposed restrictions directly on the amount of capital inflows into the country 
through taxation. In the aftermath of the crisis, the United States’ monetary policy was 
quantitative easing which forced the United States’ exchange rate to appreciate with significantly 
low interest rates. Because of the low interest rates the Federal Reserve set, domestic investments 
did not offer high returns and as a result, investors turned their attention back to Brazil. Brazil ‘s 
interest rate remained relatively high throughout this period to combat inflation (Chamon, 
Garcia, 2016 p. 164), and this enticed foreign investment with the promise of higher yields than 
in the United States. This brought in an influx of capital flows back into Brazil, in which the 
Brazilian state was concerned with the fact that the significant degree of flows which were 
unsustainable, would overwhelm the economy. There were also concerns that the inflows would 
result in a currency appreciation which would lessen the competitiveness of tradeable goods. 
And they would fuel first the consumption boom and asset price bubble as they were not being 
directed towards productive sectors (Chamon, Garcia, 2016 p. 164). The concern for the latter, is 
that the cause of the crisis was the United States’ housing bubble burst and the spillover effects 
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into other domestic sectors. It would not be beneficial for Brazil’s domestic economy, if as a 
result of the crisis and global recession, for a domestic asset bubble to form and then later to 
burst. Therefore, as proactive measures to ensure that the economy would avoid exacerbating the 
effects of the crisis domestically, restrictions on foreign capital flows were enforced.  
 The Brazilian government restricted capital flows by taxing any exchange rate 
transactions through he IOF tax (Chamon, Garcia, 2016 p. 166). It includes taxes on stocks, 
income, portfolio equity, and borrowing abroad (Chamon, Garcia, 2016 p. 167), with the 
intention of protecting the economy after a decade of positive economic growth. This was a step 
in preserving the balance of the economy. With an influx of capital flows, there is a possibility 
that the inflows will affect the income distribution disproportionately. Agents that actively trade 
in the financial markets are affected by the changes in the money supply prior to other agents 
within the economy (Lagarda, Linares, Gallagher, 2017 p.9). Typically, agents who are closet to 
the financial market are the “capitalists”, those who are profit-earners within the top income 
shares of the economy (Lagarda, Linares, Gallagher, 2017 p. 9). As the money supply increases, 
those who are the most active will receive the benefits of the increase, redistributing or 
maintaining the wealth back towards those agents. Therefore, increasing the disparity in the 
income distribution results with the agents that are not as actively connected to the financial 
market, reaping the benefits last.  
 
3.2.2 Effects of Capital Flows on Income Inequality in Brazil 
 Capital flows in Brazil have been the root cause for crises in the past. There is limited 
regulation in the volume and trajectory of inflows, which has proved to be an issue with the 
crises from the last three decades as evidence. There are still economists who believe that a high 
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magnitude of capital flows are beneficial for developing economies. The IMF has recently 
changed its stance on capital controls, now in favor of them but only in the short term. It argues 
that, “capital controls should be temporary and that their aim is precisely to have a short-term 
effect on the volume of capital inflows” (Jinjarak, Noy, 2013 p. 4).  
  In the 1980s, the debt crisis was a result of an unmaintainable debt which created 
economic instability. Leading up to the crisis there were no regulations on the amount of capital 
flows nor the extent of debt that was permissible. Eventually, economists had to admit that there 
was a debt crisis that spanned the entirety of Latin America. This event was replicated in the 
1999 crisis in Brazil which was a result of contagion effects and spillovers due to high volume of 
capital flows which were eventually reversed in the initial period of the crisis. Speculations on 
the possibilities of contagion resulted in investors fleeing and the state selling their foreign 
exchange reserves to ease the burden of debt in the contractionary period.  
 Both instances were direct results of little regulation in the foreign capital market. And as 
a result of these crises the domestic economy’s income inequality was exacerbated. In cases 
where capital is flowing into an emerging market economy with weak formal institutions and is 
susceptible to crises, there is usually an exacerbatory effect. Because capital was flowing into the 
economy at a high rate and volume, the effects were ultimately negative for the economy and the 
income distribution. The capital is meant to trigger domestic investment to stimulate economic 
growth in which GDP increases. With GDP’s increase, Brazil and in other emerging market 
economies, the focus shifts towards primarily commodity exports, with the capital being used to 
expand the industry. This expansion in the commodity sector comes at a cost, other export and 
import industries suffer and it creates an imbalanced current account with a surplus in the 
liability side of the balance sheet, proving to be risky for the economy. With these factors, the 
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currency appreciates and result in a decrease in competitiveness for exports.  This creates 
instability within the economy by way of a commodity boom. In Brazil, the capital flows which 
are meant to stimulate domestic investment to trigger economic growth instead result in a 
consumption boom. The foreign direct investment artificially stimulates the economy so 
consumer’s income is artificially increased, leading to an increase in consumption and to 
economic growth. 
 Therefore, the relationships that exist between capital flows and income inequality in 
emerging market economies can be applied to Brazil. Capital flows have affected Brazil’s 
economy, mostly negatively. In the last three decades, Brazil has not experienced capital flows 
that are not considered high volume. In a crisis or a contractionary period, capital flows 
exacerbate the income disparity. Figure 8 illustrate the effects capital flows have on income 
inequality. There appears to be a negative relationship which becomes apparent beginning in the 
early 1990s, which can be attributed to the period before the Real Plan and the benefits from it. 
During an economic crisis, the bottom and middle incomes are more vulnerable to external 
economic shocks, and as a result, they are generally the last to recover from a downturn. It is 
because in the economy, the top incomes and the government actions come at a cost, and the cost 
in the past, has been predominantly paid by the lower and middle incomes. They are also the 
shares of incomes that maintain the smallest ratio of per capita income shared amongst the 
population included in the income share. The fact is, that capital is trickled down from the top 
income shares to the bottom, with the bottom and the middle income shares receiving the least. 
These shares, particularly the bottom income, are reliant on social welfare programs and the 
effects of decisions made by the state and the members of the top income shares.  
 The effects of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and the Factor Price Equalization 
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Theorem is not what is expected in theory. Factor Price Equalization Theorem and the Stolper-
Samuelson are both underlying theories for the Washington Consensus’ policies promoting 
capital flows to better benefit emerging market economies. Their purpose was not only to 
stimulate economic growth which in turn should aid in economic development, but as to justify 
the high volume of capital flows which benefitted investors with higher returns than if invested 
elsewhere. In a sense, developed countries were taking advantage of Brazil’s capital resources as 
well as the physical resources, i.e. commodities for cheaper prices.  
 In a country who has continuously perpetuated inequality, capital flows have served only 
to exacerbated the effects of income inequality during a crisis or a contraction. Within the last 15 
years, income inequality in Brazil has decreased. Reasons as to how the decrease in income 
inequality is examined further.   
 
3.3 Income Inequality in Brazil 
 The previous chapters offered insights into Brazil’s income inequality and the influences 
that have impacted the initial trajectory from the ISI model to the present, including criticisms of 
mainstream development and trade economics. This resulted in the analysis of a common belief, 
specifically in articles authored by neoclassical economists. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the 
global income inequality has increased with most developed countries and low-income countries 
facing this trend. This current trend of inequality has miraculously been the contrary in Latin 
America, with an overall decrease in inequality. Brazil’s decline in income inequality has by far 
been impressive to the developed countries and institutions, i.e. the World Bank and the IMF. 
Although this statement is not an outright lie, it is quite misleading. Literature up to and within 
the past decade has corroborated this narrative. The literature on this has attempted to create a 
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certain reasoning of this through specific lenses or focus on specific aspects within the economy. 
Gobetti and Orair’s (2017) article considers the effects of taxation on income inequality in Brazil 
through the lens of personal income and its relationship to inequality through redistribution. 
Ferreira, Firpo, and Messina analyze mechanisms that might have caused the decline in the 
income inequality in the period 1995-2012. They suggest five factors, (1) human capital; (2) 
labor market institutions; (3)  demographic characteristics; (4)  spatial segmentation; and, (5) 
sectoral distribution of labor force, and moving forth in their paper, they concluded that both the 
change in the structure of remuneration in the labor market and the experience premium, both 
had downward effects on the income inequality (Ferreira, et al., 2017 p. 4).  
 Recently, studies have presented a slightly different case in which Brazil’s total income 
inequality has decreased overall, but the degree is not as significant as initially led to believe 
(Morgan, 2017 p. 4). A significant decrease was seen in the years subsequently following the 
initial period of macroeconomic stability in 1994 (Ferreira, et al., 2017 p. 34). Of the latest 
studies published is Marc Morgan’s paper in the World Income and Wealth Database’s working 
paper series which is associated with the work that Thomas Piketty does with income inequality 
and capital. Morgan’s (2017) paper, “Extreme and Persistent Inequality: New evidence from 
Brazil Combining National accounts, surveys and fiscal data, 2001-2015” provides an improved 
understanding of the events and economic factors that resulted in a decline in Brazil’s income 
inequality. Francisco H. G. Ferreira, Sergio P. Firpo, and Juliãn Messina’s (2017) paper, “Ageing 
Poorly? Accounting for the Decline in Earnings Inequality in Brazil, 1995-2010” concluding 
remarks offer supplementary information, more so on the development of the earned income. 
 
3.4 Historical Trends of Income Inequality 
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 Morgan (2017) gives a brief historical context of the events that were notable in the 
perpetuation and lasting trends of income inequality. His historical account spans from the 
abolishment of slavery all the way to the early 2000s, which is where the historical narratives of 
this paper and Morgan, overlap. Since the colonization of Brazil, systematic inequality has been 
a chronic issue which has been continuously perpetuated as seen with economic development 
that slowly unfolded, there was an emphasis on a small group with high skill and capital 
premium which was preserved by the decentralization of power well into the 1930s (Morgan, 
2017 p. 20). The 1930s brought to Brazil a transition of developmental catch-up and the 
subsequent years following formalized social security, increased spending on education, 
infrastructure investment, state government banks, nationalization of railroads, subsidies to 
commodity production, large public industrial enterprises, universal suffrage, decreased 
illiteracy, and deindustrialization (Morgan, 2017 p. 20). All brought about through the semi-
erratic transitioning from the political right to the political left. 
 This led to the political regimes of the 1980s. They corresponded with the debt crisis that 
spanned Latin America and the contagion from an unstable period for the Brazilian economy 
which marked the 1970s to the 1980s. The 1990s were the years immediately following the debt 
crisis and are associated with the neoclassical policies that both successfully stabilized the 
economy at all costs, and those which altered the trajectory of the income inequality in the 
economy. They negatively affected the relationship between economic growth and income 
inequality through subverted exploitation and liberalization in several sectors, i.e. financial, 
capital, trade. The Real Plan in 1994 signified hope for the future which brought with it 
macroeconomic stability. The success of it initiated the increased attractiveness of domestic 
investment via foreign investors, culminated in an increase in foreign direct investments (FDIs). 
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FDIs flowed into the country with the intention of expanding domestic investment, instead it 
produced a commodity boom organized around exports (Kregel, 2000 p. 4). This evolved into a 
consumption boom which artificially triggered economic growth and thereby macroeconomic 
stability that is owed to the Real Plan propelling Brazil into the 21st century.  
 In the 1990s, Fernando Cardoso’s regime, the Workers Party (PT) emphasized social 
welfare, devoting and investing in social welfare institutions and programs aimed at the absolute 
and relatively impoverished (Morgan, 2017 p. 22). It was used as a mechanism for inducing 
positive economic growth and development from the bottom up. The bounds that were made in 
increasing educational attainment were successful, but it increased the supply of educated 
workers with little change in the demand which resulted in the decline of the wage skill premium 
(Morgan, 2017 p. 21; Ferreira, et al. , 2017 p. 4). This summary of the historical events that 
occurred is to offer context for better understanding of the trends of income inequality in the past 
to better understand the trajectory of income inequality.  
 
3.5 Morgan’s Analysis of Income Inequality 
 Income inequality in Brazil began to decline as early as the early 2000s, resulting from 
the success of Cardoso’s third stabilization plan, the Real Plan, which brought macroeconomic 
stability and an export-driven commodity boom. Simultaneously, Cardoso reallocated 
government spending to education and introduced programs targeted towards the reduction of 
poverty, acknowledging the relatively significant degree of inequality that existed. Inequality has 
continued to decline progressively throughout the 2000s and into the 2010s which is evident in 
Figure 10 which demonstrates the income inequality in relation to GDP. Throughout the Global 
Financial Crisis, the income inequality in Brazil continued to decline, not deterred by it, which 
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had a significant impact on the rest of the world. Even with the progressive measures taken to 
ensure growth within the Bottom 50 percent, the gap remains to be wider than reported, when the 
shares of income are analysed. Figure 11 illustrates the disparity between the Top 10 percent, 
Bottom 50 percent and the Middle 40 percent. The data covers the period 2001-2015, revealing 
the stagnation of all income shares. In Figure 11, there is also evidence of a gradual increase in 
the shares of the Bottom 50 percent and a tendency for the Top 10 percent’s shares to fluctuate 
more. Two things to bring attention to are, firstly there is a significantly rapid decline in the Top 
10 percent’s share in 2005. Secondly, the Middle 40 percent’s shares, instead of increasing along 
with the Bottom 50 percent are decreasing, suggesting, according to Morgan, the middle class is 
being “squeezed out”15 (Morgan, 2017 p. 15).  
 Figure 11 is consistent with the results that Morgan emphasized, the income of the Top 
10 percent, the smallest group, is far more than the income of both the Middle 40 percent and the 
Bottom 50 percent. With the richest 10 percent in the population receiving over half of the total 
national income, the portion of the total national income that the Middle 40 percent receive is 
less than one third. The Bottom 50 percent, earns five times less than the Top 10 percent’s 
earned income of the total national income (Morgan, 2017 p. 15)16, revealing the Top 10 percent 
and Bottom 50 percent’s income increased at positive rates at the expense of the Middle 40 
percent. The rise in the Bottom 50 percent’s income can be partially attributed to the massive 
spending programs the Workers Party (PT) had undertaken with reallocation to education and 
                                                 
15 A middle class being “squeezed out” is evident in other developed countries. The middle class 
is continuously shrinking, with an increase in government spending going towards programs 
aimed at the lower class, the benefits the lower class receive do not translate to the middle class. 
As the lower class increases, it is at the expense of the middle class.  
16 These results and the subsequent results that are important in this sub-section are sourced from 
Morgan’s (2017) manipulation of the national accounts data and the fiscal data. His use of the 
survey data (PNAD) will be used in later results that are essential to his conclusions.  
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human capital through an increase in the minimum wage (Morgan, 2017 p. 22). Both factors 
specifically affected the Bottom 50 percent more so than the other shares. The national income 
shares only allude to where the flows are directioned towards, not the magnitude of them.  
 To further understand the degree of Brazil’s inequality, Morgan includes in his analysis 
evidence of the degree of concentration of national income which is an additive to the growing 
narrative from data that was forming. “Surveys say that inequality fell over the last 15 years 
while national income shows an increase in concentration at the Top, less of an increase at the 
Bottom, and an “ever-squeezed” Middle over the period” (Morgan, 2017 p. 16). These results 
can essentially be interpreted, as the flow of income in Brazil throughout the period, is 
concentrated in the Top 10 percent evident in the amount of national income flowing into the 
share. The increase in the Bottom 50 percent, which is less than the increase in incomes in the 
Top 10, speaks to both the effectiveness of the increased government involvement in the 
economy. This includes objectives of redistribution and increased bargaining power, and the fact 
that the incomes of the Top 10 percent are larger than the incomes of the Bottom 50 percent. The 
effectiveness of the policies are only marginally effective. Brazil’s reported trend of inequality 
continues to hold with the consideration of the concentration of income. Figure 12 illustrates the 
Bottom 90 percent compared to the Top 10 percent and the degree of disparity that is apparent, 
especially in the last 10 years of the study. In 2005, there is indications of a rapid decline in the 
shares of the Top 10 percent, but in the last decade both shares have once again diverged. 
Basically, both Figure 11 and Figure 12 clarify where the decline in inequality is originating 
from, the decrease in the income inequality originates within the increasing income shares of the 
Bottom 50 percent more so than the Middle 40 percent, when the Bottom 90 percent is split to 
include the middle-income households.  
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3.5.1 Labor Income Shares 
 Morgan decomposes income by isolating labor income shares and how they have 
functioned as an additive to his argument. Morgan (2017) discovered that labor inequality 
decreased when he combined the survey and fiscal data. Specifically, the Top 10 percent’s labor 
share declined by more than the value of the fiscal share, in contrast, the Middle 40 percent’s 
labor share increased. In the Bottom 50 percent, the share increased by more than the fiscal 
share’s increase (Morgan, 2017 p. 16). How Morgan estimates the labor share is via the “raw 
estimates” from the surveys corrected by combining with the fiscal data which he utilizes to 
construct the variable, fiscal income. These results that Morgan gets suggest that the income of 
the Top 10 percent are primarily flowing from the capital incomes which are derived from the 
fiscal income of the stock market and other market transactions. The Middle 40 percent’s data 
indicates that there is an increase in the labor share. The income that is originates in the returns 
from labor is increasing at a higher rate than the flows from capital incomes. This trend in 
addition to the trend of the national account income, indicates a decrease of the disparity between 
the value of shares of national income that flow to both the Top 10 percent and Bottom 50 
percent. Further, there is an expansion in the gap between the Top 10 percent and the Bottom 50 
percent’s value of shares of fiscal incomes simultaneously with a reduction in the gap of labor 
flowing to those shares.  
 
3.5.2 Global Context 
 In Morgan’s analysis, he puts his data in terms that are relative, by comparing in the 
global context. International comparisons put the results from the data into perspective with the 
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income shares that are comparable. The figures that are being examined only include 
comparisons between Brazil, the United States and China. Morgan also, briefly includes France 
in his international comparisons. The Top 10 percent income shares of Brazil are compared to 
the corresponding shares in the United States. Figure 13 represents this relationship, with the Top 
10 percent share in Brazil is marginally higher than the Top 10 percent share in the United 
States, on average by 10 percent. Figures 14 and 15 are remarkably similar in illustrating the 
degree of concentration in the top shares in context with the corresponding top shares of a 
developed country like the United States. Proving that Brazil is dealing with a higher 
concentration in the incomes of the Top 10 percent and the Top 1 percent. But even among the 
Top 10 percent and the Top 1 percent, there is a large gap that indicates that there is also a large 
amount of inequality among the top income shares.  
 Brazil’s Top 10 percent and the Top 1 percent are significantly higher than the equivalent 
shares in the United States and China, respectively, by at least 10 percentage points (Morgan, 
2017 p. 17). Brazil’s Bottom 50 percent shares are increasingly converging to the levels that of 
the United States which is evident in the results that Morgan saw in the data, with the consistent 
increase in the income and growth rates. The Middle 40 percent is the most interesting in that its 
growth is the only share that is below the proportional shares of the other countries (Morgan, 
2017 p. 17). Figure 16 concurs, showing the surprising products of the comparisons; the Middle 
40 percent is compared to the comparable shares in both China and the United States. There is a 
significant difference in the comparisons of the Top 10 percent and Bottom 50 percent. The 
Middle 40 percent in Brazil is far lower than the corresponding shares in the United States and 
China, by at least 10 percentage points for China. All of Brazil’s shares are gradually declining at 
an equal rate. It is a testament to the initial volume of Brazil’s middle class and the consequential 
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“squeezing out” that is occurring in both middle income countries and high income countries 
with the focus solely on inequality on in the bottom proportions of the economies. The 
comparisons offer further insight into the degree of Brazil’s income shares in relation to the 
comparable shares in the United States and China.  
 
3.5.3 Decline in Economic Growth 
 This is the point where Morgan’s analysis diverges from other explanations of the income 
inequality in Brazil. Morgan continues to solidify his findings by calculating the concentration of 
growth within the Top 10 percent, Middle 40 percent, and Bottom 50 percent. Between 2001 and 
2010, Brazil was experiencing expansionary economic growth due to the lasting impacts that the 
Real Plan brought, with the macroeconomic stability. A consumption boom was eventually 
promoted, spurring the Brazilian economy into the 21st century. Morgan includes data results 
which represent the total cumulated real growth rate, which was approximately 18.3 percent 
(2017 p. 17). In that period, the Bottom 50 percent’s income growth rate was strong relative to 
the income growth rates of the Middle 40 percent and the Top 10 percent. In fact, the Middle 40 
percent experienced a rate which was less than the average of the population (Morgan, 2017 p. 
17), substantiating the earlier results which indicated the decline in the flows of national income 
to the income group. Although the Bottom 50 percent had the strongest growth performance, the 
bulk of the growth was disproportionately captured by the top income shares of the distribution. 
It remains that the Bottom 50 percent has significantly low levels of incomes and low shares of 
income, which was why a remarkable amount of growth was associated with the top income 
shares (Morgan, 2017 p. 17). Dividing the period into two sections, 2001-2007 and 2007-2015, 
in the years that followed the financial crisis (2007-2015), there was an evident decline in 
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growth. This decline can be attributed to the top incomes and their highly volatile incomes 
(Morgan, 2017 p. 17) which were heavily reliant on the capital markets. Capital markets are the 
most vulnerable to a crisis or external shock. This was evident in the incomes of the richest 
100,000 individuals, which was higher in 2007 compared to 2015 (Morgan, 2017 p. 17). 
Ultimately, through data analysis, Morgan has reached the conclusion that previous, less 
extensive reports on the inequality in Brazil underestimated the levels of income at the top. 
Which caused an overestimation of the decline in the income inequality which Morgan has 
clarified by breaking his data up into the shares proportional to the income brackets. This 
presented a fuller and more detailed understanding of what groups were benefiting versus being 
harmed and which groups were the cause of the decline.  
 
Conclusion 
 The income inequality that has been present in Brazil has been affected by the high 
intensity capital flows promoted by the Washington Consensus and the capital controls which 
were put into place during the global financial crisis as an economic tool to maintain the 
economic stability. The high influx of capital flows have for the most part, negatively impacted 
Brazil. They are exploitative and can be causes for an economy’s vulnerability to external shock.  
 Capital flows in the past have only served to exacerbate the income inequality that is 
present for several reasons. Firstly, foreign direct investments and other forms of capital flows 
are not necessarily utilized in the sectors that would benefit the most from them, i.e. welfare, 
infrastructure, development; instead going to causes that serve the government officials interests. 
Secondly, as was evident in Morgan’s analysis, there is a disproportional concentration of capital 
income that flows towards the top income shares. The result is a top down trickle of income, 
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where the top incomes benefit first and foremost from the capital flows and the market actions. 
From there the middle and bottom income shares receive second-hand benefits from the capital. 
Thirdly, specifically in a period of contraction, asymmetric information is an issue. Those who 
are closest to the capital market reap the benefits of the knowledge of a downturn and can 
negotiate the impacts with better resource capabilities and are the first to know/speculate, 
therefore are better prepared. Fourthly, in the newly vulnerable economy, external shocks can 
rapidly affect the economy resulting in an economic crisis which was what happened in Brazil in 
the past. Crises generally are more detrimental for the bottom and middle income shares. In the 
recent crises, they are the last to recover as the sectors of the economy that the crisis affects, 
impacts the middle and bottom income shares the most. With a disproportionate resource 
allocation, the capacity for the middle and bottom income shares to recover is limited without 
government intervention.  
 In Brazil, the government intervention which came with the Bolsa Família being restored 
was the turning point for income inequality. In the early 2000s, the Bolsa Familia was revived 
and it specifically targeted the bottom income shares. During that same period, Brazil was 
experiencing a decade of economic stability which also proved to be beneficial for the income 
distribution. Both these factors combined, are reason enough as to why the Bottom 50 percent’s 
income share had increased from 2001 to 2015.  
 In Brazil, it can be said that either way, eventually, the high influx of capital flows into 
the economy have led to either a crisis or a recession. The neoliberal policies only served to 
exacerbate this. In periods of crisis and a contraction in the economy, capital flows only 
exacerbate the income inequality. In expansionary periods, capital flows are beneficial in they 
promote domestic investment which triggers economic growth and development, which is 
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partially true for Brazil. They also increase the vulnerability of the economy, especially in 
economies which have to some degree financially liberalized. 
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Conclusion 
 Income inequality in Brazil remains to be a pervasive issue as the income inequality is 
among the highest globally. Most of the literature that attends to income inequality focuses on 
the relationships between income inequality and investment into human capital. This paper has 
analysed the mostly negative relationship between capital flows and income inequality in Brazil 
within the past 35 years, from the 1980s debt crisis to as current as 2015.  
 The historical analysis gave context to the Washington Consensus’ policies and the 
resounding consequences of the policies. By forcing developing and emerging market economies 
to financially liberalize simultaneously while reintegrating into the global capital market in a 
period of recovery has lasting effects. The inclusion of the descriptions of the neoclassical trade 
theories, the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and the Factor-Price Equalization Theorem and the 
alternative theory initially proposed by Hyman P. Minsky, applied in the global context provided 
a further understanding of the generalizations made by the Washington Consensus. It illustrated 
the flaws within the theories, in that they are no longer a reflection of how the economy 
functions and the mechanisms and factors within it.  
 Minsky’s Theory of Financial Fragility, provided an alternative to the neoclassical 
theories predominantly enforced in trade policies. It offered a brief policy suggestion that there 
should be reforms in financial institutions that reflect the degree of financial liberalization and 
financial openness. And there should be an awareness of the harmful effects that capital flows 
may have on developing countries and as such, there should be restrictions in place on an excess 
amount of capital inflows.  
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 The effects of capital flows on income inequality in Brazil have been illustrated. Brazil’s 
income distribution has been deconstructed in the period 2001-2015 using Morgan’s initial 
research. There is a progressive “squeezing out” of the middle income shares via the bottom 
income shares gaining whilst the top income shares are stagnant. This has resulted in the 
reduction of the overall income inequality in the economy and to a singular conclusion. 
Eventually, the high influx of capital flows into the economy have led to either a crisis or a 
recession. The neoliberal policies only served to exacerbate this. In periods of crisis and a 
contraction in the economy, capital flows only exacerbate the income inequality. In expansionary 
periods, capital flows are beneficial in they promote domestic investment which triggers 
economic growth and development. They also increase the vulnerability of the economy, 
especially in economies which have to some degree financially liberalized. While income 
inequality has reduced from the late 1990s to as recent as 2013, the income shares of the Bottom 
50 percent and the Middle 40 percent have decreased significantly in the recession. The 
recession has been believed to be the worst recession in Brazil’s history with the length of the 
recession and contractionary policies having a significant enough impact, deepening poverty to 
such an extent that it makes it more difficult for the impoverished to improve their conditions. 
President Tremer’s intended policies to increasing returns for foreign investments and thus 
capital flows are shifting the country away from the political left like his predecessors President 
‘Lula’ and President ‘Rouseff’ and back towards the right and neoliberalism with the possibility 
of the past mistakes returning.  
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